# FOR DIGNITY OR HONOR: THE EFFECTS OF KANTIAN AND UTILITARIAN DUTY ORIENTATIONS ON THIRD-PARTY RESPONSES TO ABUSIVE SUPERVISION

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**ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION**

For Dignity or Honor: The Effects of Kantian and Utilitarian Duty Orientations on Third-Party Responses to Abusive Supervision

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Dr. Chao C. Chen

Research has shown that third parties' sense of duty can explain their reactions to the abusive supervision of coworkers, where duty has been theorized as a general concept to contrast with instrumental explanations of moral behaviors. Recently, researchers started investigating different duty orientations in organizations, including one's perceived duty to organizational members, missions, and codes. This dissertation argues that such conceptualization of duty has primarily focused on Utilitarian duty orientation (UDO). In contrast, moral duty orientations in the deontological tradition, particularly Kantian ethics, were missing. Drawn from Kant's discussion on the duty to not disrespect others, this dissertation proposed a new construct termed Kantian duty orientation (KDO), defined as the employees' volition to refrain from disrespecting others. Based on individual differences in duty orientations, I construct a model that contrasts the effects of Kantian-based and Utilitarian-based duty orientations on the perception of observed abusive supervision and the subsequent emotions (anger and empathy) and behaviors (supervisor deviance and coworker support). Study 1 documents the development of the Kantian Duty Orientation (KDO) scale, with results supporting its initial reliability and validity. Studies 2 and 3 (N=503 and 390) tested the theoretical model by contrasting the effects of KDO and UDO. The results from both field survey studies indicate a negative relationship between the two duty orientations and observed abusive supervision, which, in turn, leads to negative relationships with

emotional and behavioral responses. This dissertation highlights how moral duty shapes the complex interactions among third parties, victims, and aggressors in organizational settings. In the interest of establishing moral motives, previous third-party studies have generally assumed or created situations in which the third party has little stake in what they observe, thereby making standing up to the aggressor less challenging. Since both KDO and UDO are deeply situated in organizations, the complex relationships that the third party has with the aggressor and the victim may account for these results. This argument is consistent with the theory and research on organizational silence and the challenges of promoting voice in organizations. The dissertation's limitations, future research directions, and theoretical and practical implications were also discussed.

## PREFACE

I am responsible for all aspects of this dissertation, with many ideas and refinements made based on the feedback and comments from my dissertation committee, chaired by Dr. Chao Chen and including (in alphabetical order) Dr. Dong, Liu, Dr. Tobey Scharding, and Dr. Alex Van Zant. Dr. Shiyong Xu from the Renmin University of China provided organizational contacts for the data collection of studies 2 and 3.

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to: my parents, Yali Wang, and Lanying Zhu, for their unconditional love and support; my wife, Yanan Chen, for her companionship over the past thirteen years; my sons, Michael and Jack, for showing me the best in humanity and dignity; and my mentor Dr. Chao C. Chen, for being a friend and role model.

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Abusive supervision focuses on the individuals' perception of abuse and is defined as the perceived supervisor's sustained but non-physical hostility toward the subordinates (Tepper, 2000). Because the intent of abusive supervision can be ambiguous (Bies et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2012), it could be especially challenging for third parties to formulate moral responses when they are not the direct victims. For example, while most studies to date found that third parties are outraged when they witness abusive supervision of coworkers (Priesemuth, 2012; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019), they all treat abusive supervision as an objective phenomenon. But dispositional differences can also affect third parties' perceptions of abusive supervision, which has been an understudied area (Tepper et al., 2006; Tepper et al., 2017). Perhaps because of its theoretical bandwidth, abusive supervision has received ample attention in the third-party research paradigm. Although third parties could act rationally and ethically against the abusive supervision of coworkers, such as protecting the coworker (Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019) or logging a complaint against the abusive supervisor (Lin & Loi, 2019), they also exhibit deviant behaviors that counter group norms or normative standards (Warren, 2003). More specifically, depending on the emphasis of the referent and justice scope, their reactions can be categorized as the avenger, protagonist, copycat, or collaborator (Mitchell et al., 2012).

To understand the mechanisms that precede such a broad categorization of behaviors, Priesemuth et al. (2017) theorized the Third-party Reactions to the Workplace Aggression Model, which suggested moral emotions, social emotions, cognitions, and self-regulations as the motivational processes that explain the destructive/punishing and constructive/helpful behaviors. Specifically, deontic response, i.e., anger or moral outrage,

as a typical moral emotion is the key mechanism in research drawing on deonance theory (Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019); fear as a social emotion was associated with the approach-avoidance framework (Zhang et al., 2019); perceived suffering as a cognitive consideration was investigated through the lenses of both social learning (Hu et al., 2022) and appraisal theories (Chen et al., 2021) and moral identity is the key construct in self-regulation research (Lin & Loi, 2019; O'Reilly et al., 2016). As research accumulates, moral emotion has emerged as a dominant perspective, which was often studied from a deontic justice perspective (Folger, 2001; Folger & Glerum, 2015; Folger & Stein, 2017).

Folger (2001) conceptualized moral duty as the lack of instrumental motives behind moral behaviors and proposed deonance theory, which suggests that although we have the freedom to withhold our actions (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), we still felt a moral ought-force to do the right thing (Heider, 1958). However, deonance theory and its underlying concepts purposely distance themselves from specific philosophical traditions and focus on a general sense of duty (Folger et al., 2013; Folger & Stein, 2017). A general duty allows the theory to cut across philosophical traditions (Folger, 2012, p. 126), so it can capture individual differences in their perceived rather than the actual duties (Folger & Glerum, 2015, p. 333). Moreover, a general duty allows deonance theory to be multidirectional and operate as a midrange theory. For example, deonance theory does not prescribe moral behaviors but suggests our sense of duty can lead to both ethical and unethical behaviors through the mediating effects of moral outrage (Folger & Glerum, 2015, p. 336).

As deonance theory develops and becomes more generalizable, an important observation is that not all third parties will take action (Greenbaum et al., 2013; Rupp &

Bell, 2010; Skarlicki et al., 2008). This observation is consistent with the theory and research on organizational silence and the challenges of promoting voice in organizations (Morrison, 2014). To investigate this phenomenon, existing research has investigated the boundary effects of moral outrage as the result of witnessing mistreatment, such as third-party exclusion beliefs about the abused coworker (Mitchell et al., 2015) and overall organizational justice (Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). On the other hand, the individual factors that could affect deontic responses were not thoroughly investigated (Priesemuth et al., 2017). For example, because abusive supervision is a perception, could individual factors affect the perception of observed abusive supervision? Because it stands to reason third parties' duty orientations and deontic responses are closely related, this dissertation tries to answer the question: Do third parties' duty orientations influence their perceptions and responses to abusive supervision of coworkers?

In normative theories, it is well recognized that a critical difference between Kantian and Utilitarian ethics is their emphasis on individual rights to dignity or the collective good (Ünal et al., 2012). Contrasting individual differences in duty orientations could advance our understanding of the mechanisms behind third-party actions and inactions to observed interpersonal mistreatment. However, testing this theoretical model requires a clear conceptualization of duty orientations, which comes with challenges. For example, moral identity was theorized to strengthen the lower-level spontaneous anger in third parties (O'Reilly, 2013; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011; O'Reilly et al., 2016). However, moral outrage as a deontic response is a processed anger (Berkowitz, 1989) and includes higher-level emotions such as irritation and resentment (Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). Because of the different conceptual levels of anger, using moral

identity as a proxy of duty could also confound whether moral outrage was a deontic response or a product of identity consideration. Perhaps for these reasons, moral identity as a boundary condition has been incorporated into deontic research in studying third-party responses but is often theorized as a moderator of the outrage-behaviors relationships (Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). Therefore, it would be ideal to identify a duty-related construct as the individual factor.

Duty in deonance theory is difficult to measure as the counterfactual of duty is "free" behaviors, which by definition is not measurable (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Folger et al., 2013). This challenge is apparent in some conceptual shortcomings in existing measures that capture workplace duty. For example, the deontic justice scale was developed to account for individual differences in the perception of justice as an obligation (Beugre, 2012). However, justice is an overarching concept, and third-party reactions are contingent on whether an abused coworker was part of their justice considerations (Mitchell et al., 2012), or from a deservingness perspective, whether abusive behaviors in themselves are unjust (Mitchell et al., 2015). This seems to counter the notion of duty being universal (Heider, 1958). Moreover, the tendency to feel morally outraged makes a limited theoretical contribution to deonance theory; if not digress it (Beugre, 2012, p. 2173). Evidently, the deontic justice scale was used to operationalize deontic reaction as a consequence of observed mistreatment (Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019), which also aligns with its original conceptualization (Beugre, 2012, p. 2181).

On the other hand, Duty Orientation was defined as the employees' volition to serve the organizational members, mission, and codes (Hannah et al., 2014). Although the construct has moral implications to the extent of making personal sacrifices, it directs moral motivation to

external sources that seem only to capture the utilitarian duty orientation or the greatest good for the greatest number aspect. Due to the lack of conceptualization on the duty orientation to individual dignity, I draw on the normative theory of Kantian ethics (Kant, 1999) and conceptualize Kantian Duty Orientation (KDO) in this dissertation. This would allow me to contrast the normative Kantian and Utilitarian theories in the organizational context and investigate their empirical implications.

To sum up, the first contribution of this dissertation is proposing a parallel and sequential mediation model that investigates the effects of both Kantian and Utilitarian duty orientations on third-party responses to mistreatment in organizations. I argue that the two duty orientations affect third parties' perceptions of observed abusive supervision and have different emotional (anger vs empathy) and behavioral outcomes (supervisor-directed and coworker-directed). Secondly, by clearly conceptualizing duty to individual dignity, the construct of Kantian Duty Orientation fills a conceptual gap. It allows me to test the theoretical model, which could also be useful to other organizational behavior researchers. Lastly, perhaps most importantly, the dissertation could provide practical implications: What stops third parties from acting if mistreating a person is morally reprehensible? By better understanding the mechanisms behind individual responses to observed mistreatment, we could better utilize resources and effectively address these prevailing issues (Tepper et al., 2017).

In the following, Chapter 2 reviews current literature on duty orientations in the workplace, which I divided into the Kantian and Utilitarian perspectives. Chapter 3 deducts the hypotheses of the proposed model. Chapter 4 defines and develops a measure for the Kantian Duty Orientation (KDO) construct. Chapter 5 documents studies 2 and 3 (N=503

and 390), which test the theoretical model using two organizational samples. Chapter 6 discusses the results and their implications. The theoretical and hypothesized model is shown in Figure 1.

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## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Deontology focuses on rights, and utilitarianism focuses on consequences (Cavanagh et al., 1981; Haidt, 2012). In moral reasoning literature, evidence suggests both deontic and utilitarian reasoning can lead to moral behavior in the experimental context (Treviño et al., 2006). However, these findings may not be generalizable to organizational behavioral ethics research (Mitchell et al., 2020). One explanation could be that moral reasoning only has a small to moderate effect on moral behavior in an organizational context (Shao et al., 2008, p. 513), also known as the moral judgment-action gap (DeTienne et al., 2019). This weak effect is likely due to moral behavior's spontaneous nature (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez et al., 2006), which may skip the deliberate reasoning process. In contrast, moral duty research starts with ethical behaviors and traces back its mechanism, which often uses moral emotions as the mediator, to align with its intuitive nature (Haidt, 2003).

In the following, I will construct a theoretical model based on deonance theory (Folger, 2001; Folger & Glerum, 2015; Folger & Stein, 2017). The goal is to test deonance theory using two variants of duty orientations: Kantian duty orientation (KDO) and utilitarian duty orientation (UDO), which treats aggregated individual interests as its moral end (Bentham, 2000), and was captured by duty orientation (Hannah et al., 2014).

## Kantian Duty Orientation and Employees' Rights to Dignity

Hume set the foundation for modern moral philosophy (Anscombe, 1958; Cohon, 2004). He famously raised the is-ought gap, referring to the impossibility of determining what ought to be from observing what is (Hume, 1960, p. 469). Moral duty in the deontological tradition often refers to Kantian duty (Folger, 2012; Rupp & Bell, 2010), and Kant's approach to addressing the is-ought gap is to divide reason into two faculties: pure/theoretical reason, which deals with the comprehension of experience (Kant, 1998a, p. 394); and practical reason, which deals with the will that determines our moral conduct (Kant, 2015, p. 17). In contrast to the object of pure reason concerns how humans came to understand the natural law, moral duty is a concept in Kant's discussion of practical reasoning that concerns how we can realize our free will through our actions by abiding by the moral law, which sets the foundation of dignity.

However, dignity cannot yield rights without a clear definition and justification (Sensen, 2011, pp. 147-152, 163). Kant's approach is to bridge dignity and rights with duty. The theoretical relations between dignity, rights, and duty are complex in Kantian ethics because Kant indirectly defines concepts like dignity (Kant, 1998b, p. 42). However, Kant did argue that dignity can only be explicated (Kant, 1991, p. 64). This implies that when contrasting with all other moralities, dignity in Kantian ethics is the absolute, hence equal, worth of all rational beings (Wood, 1999, p. xiv). In the organizational context, employees' dignity can be defined as employees' humanity as an end in itself and elevates above all organizational values.

Therefore, the right to dignity can be understood as particular instances of claim and immunity rights (Hohfeld, 1913, p. 30; Wenar, 2005). A claim right to dignity means

any person is free from disrespectable punishment regardless of their wrongdoings. In organizations, a Kantian conceptualization of employee right to dignity as a claim right indicates that employees cannot be disrespected regardless of how poor their performance is or what mistakes they have made in the organization. However, when employees enter a contract, organizations can create, waive, or annual employee rights. An immunity right to dignity makes dignity free from abuse of power. Because all human dignity is the same, thus all humans are equal, another person, such as a supervisor, cannot punish the subordinate in disrespectable ways that violate their right to dignity. The right to employee dignity is an immunity right that protects employees' dignity regardless of their positions in the organizational hierarchy. The unconditional adherence to the right of dignity in the organizational context thus satisfies Kant's criterion for moral duty: although many actions can be carried out with a sense of obligation, only when we are adhering to the moral law does the obligation become a necessity, and we call this type of obligation, duty (Kant, 1998b, p. 46).

In the organizational context, KDO assumes individuals recognize others as rational beings and have an inviolable right to their dignity at the workplace. Although Holtz and Harold (2013, p. 345) found interpersonal justice values, including employee dignity and being treated with respect, are perceived to be highly important (M=6.01, SD=0.89 on a 7-point scale). However, business ethics have long been argued to have different ethical standards from society (Trevino & Weaver, 1994). After all, the percentage of abused employees is approximately 10% (Tepper et al., 2017, p. 125).

In Kantian ethics, what happens and what a person wills/motivates to happen are separate issues. This separation allows Kant to derive the categorical imperative from the

form of goodwill rather than the object of goodness (Kant, 1998b, p. 50). Kohlberg (1981, p. 22) also uses whether the individual can reason morality as abstract judgment for the final cognitive moral development stage. In organizational behavior, Pinder (1998, p. 235) explained this as the attitude a person has toward the object (here referring to employees having an inviolate right to dignity) differs from the orientation one holds towards behaving in a certain way towards that object (here referring to the orientation to carry out the moral duty of to respect others).

In KDO, the right to dignity is the object of duty. However, the concept is about the motivation to respect this right and carry out this duty. Therefore, KDO measures the individual differences in their perceived 'I must (Wood, 2007, p. 26)' 'I ought (Heider, 1958, p. 218)' and 'I have a moral duty to (Folger, 2001, pp. 5-6)'. However, to measure such definitive motivation, the moral object has to be worthy of such duty. Kant saw respect for human dignity as a worthy object (Kant, 1991, pp. 254-259). Because it satisfies the autonomy of the will as any rational being would recognize human dignity as two concepts that define each other (a synthetic proposition) and bind the self to act accordingly by choice (Kant, 1998b, p. 47). In the organizational context, this means any rational individual, regardless of the actual percentages of abuses that occur in the workplace, will still be motivated to respect others by recognizing it is an issue of rights (Ünal et al., 2012). Therefore, the assumption that employees have an inviolable right to their dignity will likely hold at the workplace.

Another counterargument to deonance theory comes from the protective value model, which rejects prescriptive duty to others because such duty would imply infinite obligations (Baron & Ritov, 2009, p. 134). However, Kant (1991, pp. 256-257) also

expressed the duty to respect others primarily in proscriptive terms because when the duty to respect others is violated, it is a vice; he also discussed the prescriptive duty to respect others in the instances of punishment. For example, even a person whose deeds make him unworthy of our respect, we still cannot withdraw the respect and punish the person who harms his dignity. Also, even when censure is necessary, we must still respect it by uncovering the person's error and pointing it out to him. From a deonance perspective, a prescriptive duty to respect others is also possible because moral duty can be perceived without the assumption to be carried out in the workplace (Folger, 2001).

## Theoretical Implications of Kantian Duty Orientation

Because KDO and UDO share the element of moral duty, KDO needs to differentiate itself from the related constructs UDO contrasted. UDO distinguished itself from affective commitment, organizational identification, value congruence, experienced job responsibility, and collective self-construal (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 224), which I will elaborate on when reviewing UDO. However, one significant difference is that the right to dignity in KDO is not explicitly mentioned in any of the constructs above. On the other hand, the right to employee dignity is related to two organizational justice dimensions. The Group-value model in procedural justice literature argues that rights being respected is a cue for status recognition (Tyler & Blader, 2000, p. 94), and interpersonal justice has respect and dignity as its evaluative criteria (Bies & Moag, 1986). However, as mentioned earlier, KDO is about the motivation to act by these values rather than their attitudes toward them. However, the conceptual difference may not be strong enough to be distinguished empirically and needs to be validated.

The limitation of KDO is that it may not lead to ethical behaviors toward abused

coworkers. The protected value framework found that individuals who prefer deontological judgments tend to have an omission bias, i.e., prefer the harm of inactions over the same of less harm caused by the action (Baron & Ritov, 2009). Kant does not oppose helping others when requested (Kant, 1991, pp. 185-200). However, because he thought very highly of the human capacity to perfect themselves, including defending one's right to dignity when abused, third parties with KDO may hesitate to jump to the rescue. First, third-party intervention could imply that the coworkers are incapable of defending their dignity, which means the coworker had violated their duty to self-respect and that they need to oppose any violation of their dignity with the love of honor (Kant, 1991, pp. 216-217). On the other hand, third-party intervention could also put abused coworkers under obligation to show gratitude, which further undermines their dignity. Because gratitude is the love benefactor owes to the love from the protector, although it is a relation of mutual love, the respect each owes is not equal (Kant, 1991, p. 264). Therefore, individuals with KDO may still feel a strong sense of empathy towards the abused coworker because emotion is a private matter. However, they hold back on providing support in action. Therefore, due to their duty to protect the right to dignity, employees with KDO would react to the right-violator, namely the abusive supervisor in the current context, but not support the abused coworker. This is not because they lack the motivation to defend the abused coworker but the agency to defend them.

### Utilitarian Duty Orientation and Employees' Wellbeing

An immediate clarification is required here. Psychologists often treat duty as an exclusive concept for deontology (Baron & Ritov, 2009; Cavanagh et al., 1981; Haidt, 2012), so does utilitarian moral duty exist? Philosophers like Anscombe (1958) argued that

utilitarianism and deontology were related to duty but only differed in the object of duty. In fact, the term deontology was popularized by Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, as the title of his unpublished book (Postema, 2006). Bentham's main argument is that the most extensive and durable pleasure is other-oriented and only accessible by making others' happiness your interest. However, this type of other-oriented pleasure is often oblivious, if not misperceived, as against one's interest; therefore, it requires a sense of moral duty to make others' happiness your own (Bentham, 1983, pp. 124-129). In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith (2002, p. 215) shares the same notion that the rich will be led by an invisible hand to divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements because the rich seek the utility from the sentiment of approbation that only the poor can provide. Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge that utilitarianism and deontology share the concept of moral duty.

Regarding the is-ought gap, Bentham (2000, p. 14) argued that although nature cannot directly dictate what human beings ought to do, it inflicts pain and pleasure on us, thus indirectly affecting what we ought to do. Therefore, moral duty in the utilitarian tradition looks beyond individual agency and appeals to the faculty of sentiments that all humans share for obligations that maximize the greater good or indirectly by complying with its norms (Schminke et al., 2015). This conceptualization is best captured by duty orientation, defined as an individual's volitional orientation to loyally serve and faithfully support other members of the group, to strive and sacrifice to accomplish the tasks and missions of the group and to honor its codes and principles (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 220). However, in my view, this definition only captured the utilitarian dimension of a general duty orientation. I, therefore, called it utilitarian duty orientation (UDO).

## Theoretical Implications of Utilitarian Duty Orientation

UDO distinguished itself from affective commitment, organizational identification, value congruence, experienced job responsibility, and collective self-construal (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 224). The authors argued that UDO is the only construct that incorporates personal obligations, bonds, and loyalty to group members, duty to group task and mission, duty to group codes or ethics, personal identity and self-construal concern, and lastly, as a psychological state, rather than trait. UDO as a psychological state seemed to become a significant source of empirical interest because it could address how to increase employees' sense of duty to the organization and what role duty plays in the organization. Therefore, UDO has often been used as a mediator in various theoretical models. For example, take the social exchange perspective, AlKerdawy (2014) found that employees' UDO mediates the relationship between perceived organizational support and organizational citizenship behavior; Eva et al. (2020) added job performance as an outcome, and also found that ethical leadership strengthened the mediations. Taking a social learning perspective, Moss et al. (2019) found that UDO mediates the relationship between ethical leadership and reduced follower feedback avoidance.

However, as a psychological state, UDO can lead to various behaviors, including ethical, neutral, or unethical. First and foremost, UDO would prioritize coworkers' well-being, not performance, as the top priority, promoting pro-group behaviors such as taking time to help train or mentor coworkers (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 223). So, it is very likely that upon observing the abusive supervision of a coworker, their ethical acts would be directed at the abused coworker. However, they could also have neutral and unethical reactions to abusive supervisors. For example, from a regulatory perspective, third parties

might remain silent after observing abusive supervision (Huang et al., 2019; Rupp & Bell, 2010; Zhang et al., 2019). Qiao et al. (2019) also found that competitive goal interdependence could increase third-party schadenfreude upon observing peer abuse and, in turn, increase their work engagement. These behaviors are not unethical in themselves, but they could allow the abusers to continue to harm the coworkers and the organization.

Moreover, UDO argues that it is the sense of honor that guides one's moral obligations within groups (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 222). On the one hand, honor could also lead to silence because honor is attached to a person's position within a hierarchical social order (Bayefsky, 2013, p. 810). This implies that honor requires the assumption of inequality in status, role, or even rights within social groups. According to implicit voice theory, employees from hierarchical organizations believe it is the norm not to communicate upward with their direct supervisor (Detert & Edmondson, 2011). Zhang et al. (2019) also found empirical support for this notion, that other than anger could facilitate direct third-party communication and deviant behavior against the abusive supervisors; fear and avoiding contact is also a possible path. Moreover, Honor could also directly lead to unethical behaviors, as suggested by the self-protection model (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994), or in a group context when individuals honor their obligations to the authorities but feel no personal responsibility for the harm they cause (Bandura, 1999). Therefore, UDO could lead to ethical behaviors directed at the coworker out of concern for their wellbeing and not stopping the abuse from future occurrences.

## CHAPTER 3: DUTY ORIENTATIONS AND THIRD-PARTY RESPONSES TO ABUSIVE SUPERVISION

Tepper (2000, p. 178) defined abusive supervision as subordinates' perceptions of

the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviors, excluding physical contact. Abusive supervision is the ideal construct for the current project. It could be perceived as immoral because it violates employees' rights (Ünal et al., 2012) or utility-driven, which improves performance (Liu et al., 2012; Tepper et al., 2017). However, the perception of abusive supervision can refer to either self-experienced or observed as a third party. Moral psychologists often study third-party reactions to abusive supervision because they are relatively disinterested, so their actions are more likely to be morally motivated (Folger & Glerum, 2015; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Priesemuth, 2012). Therefore, this dissertation takes the same approach and studies the effects of third-party KDO and UDO on observed abusive supervision (OAS) and their emotional and behavioral reactions.

The majority of third-party studies on abusive supervision draw from deonance theory and use emotional responses as the mediating mechanism (such as anger, fear, and schadenfreude). Third-party behavioral outcomes could be categorized as supervisor or victim-directed and ethical or unethical. For example, ethical behavior was often facilitated by a third party's anger towards the abusive supervisor, which could either be directed at the supervisor by standing up to them (Priesemuth, 2012; Zhang et al., 2019), or directed at the abused coworker: either directly protecting them from abuse (Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019), or indirectly by providing work-related support (Mitchell et al., 2015). Anger, fear, contentment, and schadenfreude often facilitated unethical behaviors. Anger was often used as the mechanism to explain supervisor-directed unethical behavior (Mitchell et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2019); fear was often used as the mechanism to explain third-party silence (Huang et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019); and contentment and

schadenfreude were often used to explain coworker directed unethical behaviors (Mitchell et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2019). Although all these studies invoked the deonance theory, they also had to introduce another theory to complete their hypothesis deduction. This dissertation will keep the discussion within the moral duty terminologies and offer a parsimonious explanation.

To conclude, the theoretical model of this dissertation is constructed with previous remarks in mind, such as that KDO and UDO have their strengths and weaknesses in reaching different moral ends. The limitation of KDO is that it may withhold ethical behavior towards the abused coworker, and the limitation of UDO is that it might not react against the abusive supervisor to prevent future abuse. Considering these limitations, the proposed model highlights that upon observing abusive supervision, KDO is more relevant to supervisor-directed responses, whereas UDO is more relevant to coworker-directed responses.

## Duty Orientations and Observed Abusive Supervision

Both KDO and UDO share the element of attention that affects third parties' perception of abusive supervision. The attention-related concept assumes the effects of others' activities on one's actions and attitudes are a function of the probability one will pay attention to it, multiplied by the duration of attention focused on it (Stinchcombe, 1968, p. 236). This aligns with the conceptualization and operationalization of abusive supervision being measured as behavioral frequency (Tepper, 2000), which differs from labeling hostile behaviors as abusive (Lount et al., 2022). In moral psychology, Rest (1982) posits that moral actions, first and foremost, require awareness of the moral phenomenon. Compared to other types of unethical leadership, the normative foundation of abusive

supervision is that it violates employees' rights (Ünal et al., 2012). Therefore, abusive supervision attracts attention from employees with KDO for right-based reasons. Kant's view on rights is discussed in his practical philosophy of conduct. He argues that rights can only be applied to actions that directly affect others rather than desires and intentions (Kant, 1991, p. 56), which are internal virtues others cannot claim (Rauscher, 2007). In the current model, Kant's conceptualization of right implies KDO has narrow but focused attention on the act of abuse rather than the attribution (Weiner, 2006) or intention of the abuse (Liu et al., 2012), which could dilute the perceived frequency of abuse. Therefore, the positive relationship between KDO and perceived abusive supervision is driven by spontaneity because there is less to consider.

Moreover, Kant (1991, pp. 257-259) specifically discussed arrogance, defamation, and ridicule as vices that violate the duty to respect others, which were items 1, 2, 4, and 11, measured in the abusive supervision scale (Tepper, 2000, pp. 189-190). To Kant, these actions are abusive, not because they are false claims, but because they can often be justified (e.g., ridicule an employee who did not perform well). They will demotivate and prevent the victim from developing their reasoning faculty. Therefore, KDO would have a positive relationship with OAS on a coworker, both with its narrower focus on the right violation and sensibility to actions that are disrespectful.

***Hypothesis 1***: Kantian duty orientation is positively related to observed abusive supervision.

Compared to the disrespectful behaviors that attract the attention of third parties with higher KDO, UDO is conceptualized as a higher-order construct (Hannah et al., 2014), and its multi-dimensional structure offers more nuanced insights into why considerations

of goals, members, and codes could all affect third parties' perceptions on abusive supervision. First, the duty to members is more than just affinity towards the group but also an orientation towards solidarity and readily supporting coworkers (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 222). This suggests that individuals with high UDO would constantly monitor threats that could negatively impact a coworker's well-being, such as abusive supervision (Lin et al., 2013). Second, a duty to mission promotes task accomplishments and reduces group-limiting behavior (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 223). Abusive supervision has been identified as a significant threat to group-level performance (Xu et al., 2012), and it is likely to attract the attention of UDO employees. Lastly, UDO would promote ethical acts and limit deviant acts that could shame or dishonor the group (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 223). Abusive supervision is a type of leader deviant behavior (Thoroughgood et al., 2018), so employees high on UDO would likely pay attention and be sensitive about it.

***Hypothesis 2***: Utilitarian duty orientation is positively related to observed abusive supervision.

Although both KDO and UDO are hypothesized to be positively related to OAS, their effects are independent because abusive supervision attracts attention from highly duty-orientated third parties for different reasons. Third parties with higher UDO need to monitor ingroup and outgroup threats (Chen et al., 2016), but their primary concern is that abusive supervision reduces employees' performance. In contrast, third parties with higher KDO pay attention to abusive supervision because it undermines individual dignity, even if it could motivate performance (Bies et al., 2016).

Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that UDO employees have a higher level of cognitive demand on their calculations of the consequences of abusive supervision of

coworkers as a cost-and-benefit analysis. Given this high cognitive burden, individuals tend to take the least resistant path in such demanding situations (Janssen et al., 2008). Ego depletion theory suggests there are limited resources for individuals to maintain self-control. The constant quest for control and the high level of perceived responsibility for action could accelerate the depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998). Both KDO and UDO are psychologically demanding because not only do they have to pay attention to abuse supervision (H1 and H2), but as duties, they also must act. Under these constraints, KDO could be more positively related to OAS than UDO because they have more cognitive resources to notice abusive supervision.

***Hypothesis 3***: Kantian duty orientation is more positively related to observed abusive supervision than Utilitarian duty orientation.

**Kantian Duty Orientation and Supervisor Challenging Behaviors**

Previous research has been well established that when third parties observe abusive supervision of coworkers, they would first feel moral outrage and then take action against the abusive supervisor (Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). Given that KDO is an antecedent to OAS, it implies a sequential mediation between third parties' KDO and their behavioral response towards the abuser.

First, OAS could mediate the relationship between KDO and outrage toward the supervisor. This is because outrage is a natural emotional response towards immoral behavior (Haidt, 2003, p. 856), which also acts as the emotional trigger for restorative impulses that facilitate behavioral responses (Darley & Pittman, 2003). In the current context, moral outrage towards the abusive supervisor is likely the emotional response from employees with KDO. According to Folger and Cropanzano (2010, p. 219), moral

emotions are the results of both the type of moral duties (imperfect and perfect) and the moral impetus (self-restraint and other-constraint). Moreover, other-constraint must also account for whether the particular other was higher or lower in social position than the self. Moral outrage is a specific type of moral emotion that results from witnessing another in a higher social position violate a perfect duty. As a third-party employee witnessing a supervisor abuse another coworker, the supervisor is higher in position than the self. The perfect/imperfect duty terminology was adopted from Kant, where perfect duty accepts no exception (Kant, 1998b, p. 31). Because KDO is conceptualized as the duty to respect others' right to dignity as bonded by the categorical imperative, and abusive supervision violated such right, the supervisor violated a perfect duty. Therefore, a third party observing abusive supervision would feel outraged toward the abuser:

***Hypothesis 4***: Observed abusive supervision mediates the positive relationship between Kantian duty orientation and outrage towards an abusive supervisor.

Among behavioral responses to OAS, Priesemuth (2012, p. 47) differentiated voice measures reporting the abuse to other members of the organization, excluding the abuser; and standing up behavior, which is drawn on moral courage literature, and measures the third party's behavioral intention to stand up against the abuser directly despite the risk involved. Standing-up behavior was further divided into supervisor-challenging behaviors and coworker-protective behaviors. Evidence suggested a positive mediation between OAS, outrage, and standing-up behavior in general (Priesemuth, 2012), and standing up for coworkers (Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). KDO embraces the right to dignity, and there are several reasons right-driven individuals could stand up against the abuser directly.

First, rights-related issues are often contentious, and rights-based communication

often leads to subordinates directly voicing their concern toward the abusive supervisor (Brett et al., 1998; Tepper et al., 2007). Second, individuals who act on principle exhibit moral courage (Niesta Kayser et al., 2010), which is the theoretical foundation for standing-up behavior, and protecting the right to dignity is a principle for individuals with a high level of KDO. Lastly, third parties would focus on rights violations regardless of the actors involved, which will bypass the cost analysis and confront the supervisors, which often results in silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

***Hypothesis 5***: Observed abusive supervision mediates the positive relationship between Kantian duty orientation and supervisor-challenging behaviors.

Given that it had been well established from a deonance perspective that moral outrage mediates third-party OAS and ethical behavior (Lin & Loi, 2019; Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth, 2012; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019), taken it together with H1, H4, and H5, I propose a sequential mediation, that:

***Hypothesis 6:*** The positive relationship between Kantian duty orientation and supervisor-challenging behaviors is sequentially mediated by observed abusive supervision and outrage towards the abusive supervisor.

## Utilitarian Duty Orientation and Coworker Support

One understudied aspect of third-party responses to abusive supervision is the absence of prosocial moral emotions that are high on disinterestedness and pro-sociability (Haidt, 2003), such as empathy (Hu et al., 2022). I hypothesize that observing abusive supervision could mediate third-party UDO and empathic concern toward the abused coworker. I chose empathic concern as the focal emotional response because it minimizes the conceptual distinction between sympathy and empathy.

Sympathy has a deep philosophical root in utilitarianism under the moral sentiment banner. Hume (1983, p. 49) argues sympathy is the public and social sentiment that allows us to see humanity is not just self-interested, and we are not only sensitive to the persons near and contiguous to us but are capable of being morally responsible for humanity in general, which leads Hume to call his moral principle, the principle of humanity and sympathy. However, from a legislative perspective, Bentham (2000) argued that the principle of utility must dictate all other principles of morality, including sympathy and antipathy (p. 19), because the latter are affections and are often biased and enlarged (p. 47). Somewhat in between, Smith (2002) took the functional aspect of sympathy as the foundation of his moral theory, where sympathy is how individuals communicate with each other when morality is at stake.

In social psychology, although empathy and sympathy share similar meanings (Eisenberg, 1991), empathy was only coined by Thichener in 1909 (Haidt, 2003, p. 862). Hoffman (1982, p. 93) defines empathy as a vicarious affective response that is more appropriate to someone else's situation than to one's own, and it has affective arousal and a cognitive component. In deontic justice literature, cognitive empathy involves knowing the contents of other people's feelings through deliberate thought, and affective empathy involves automatic sharing in emotional experiences (Cropanzano et al., 2017, p. 736). In other words, when the morally relevant experience is shared, the type of sympathy is called cognitive empathy (Cohon, 2004, p. 21), whereas affective empathy does not require the assumption of shared experience but simply out of concern for others' wellbeing (Devoldre et al., 2010).

Given these conceptualizations, some researchers have taken issue with the

cognitive aspect of empathy because it makes empathy a tendency or an ability to feel whatever another person is feeling (Haidt, 2003, p. 860). Specifically, Lazarus (1991, p. 821) criticized empathy as a capacity and a process rather than emotion because emotions must be specified in advance. However, empathy could refer to both valences, such as joy and sadness, so he used the term compassion to emphasize others' suffering. Eisenberg (1991, p. 129) also focused on the negative emotions of other persons when she tried to redefine sympathy based on Hoffman's definition of empathy, which involves only feelings of sorrow or concern for the other.

However, the affective aspect of empathy had been less controversial. Davis (1980, p. 6) defined empathic concern as the feeling of concern, sorry, and sympathy for the suffering of others who are undergoing a negative experience. This aligns with the definitions of compassion and sympathy from Lazarus and Eisenberg, which all point to the emotional reactions after witnessing other's mishaps or what happened deviated from what was being expected in a negative sense. In the context of morality, what we expect is often called a moral norm. According to Folger (2001), moral duty is activated when one witnessed a deviation from the moral norms, such as abusive supervision. Therefore, the very fact that employees with UDO who care about their fellow coworkers observe abusive supervision is sufficient to elicit affective empathy towards the abused victim.

***Hypothesis 7***: Observed abusive supervision mediates the positive relationship between Utilitarian duty orientation and empathic concern towards an abused coworker.

The relationship between UDO and the nature of coworker-directed ethical behavior is still debated. Taking the victim deservingness perspective (Feather, 1999), Mitchell et al. (2015, p. 4) argued that if a third party perceives the abuse as deserved, it is

acceptable to exclude the victim from receiving the same dignified and respectable treatment as the self, which could negatively affect coworker support. However, from a moral duty perspective, UDO would put coworkers' well-being, not performance, as a priority, which would promote pro-group behaviors such as taking time to help train or mentor coworkers (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 223). This implies a direct effect between UDO and coworker support. Moreover, perceived organizational support has been argued as the antecedent to duty orientation (AlKerdawy, 2014; Eva et al., 2020). Under a social exchange and reciprocity perspective, coworker support is likely coming from other coworkers who had observed abusive behavior and provided support. Therefore:

***Hypothesis 8***: Observed abusive supervision mediates the positive relationship between Utilitarian duty orientation and coworker support.

Lastly, affective empathy has been used to explain various helping behaviors in prosocial motivation research (Batson, 1995; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990) and Cropanzano et al. (2017) had theorized affective empathy towards the victim of a harmful event to be a motivator in their theoretical model of deontic justice. Empirical evidence also indicates empathy generates social support in families when one party perceives the other party needs support (Devoldre et al., 2010). Empathic concern as an emotional trait is correlated with victim helping after witnessing abusive supervision (O'Reilly, 2013). Therefore, empathic concern towards the abused coworker as an emotional state will mediate the relationship between observing them being abused and providing support. Taken this relationship together with H3, H7, and H8, I hypothesis

***Hypothesis 9***: The positive relationship between Utilitarian duty orientation and coworker support is sequentially mediated by observed abusive supervision and empathic

concern towards the abused coworker.

# CHAPTER 4: KANTIAN DUTY ORIENTATION: SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

In this dissertation, KDO is treated as a dispositional variable under the assumption that employees are capable of not disrespecting each other's dignity across work functions. However, looking at an individual's life span, moral development researchers may consider the duty to dignity as a late developmental stage as it focuses on the justice-related concepts of respect and dignity (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). The practical implication of the trait-state property of KDO is that interventions focused on duty to dignity are not to teach us to respect each other but to remind us of the duty we already know. The conceptual space KDO occupies among similar constructs is shown in Table 1.

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Insert Table 1 about here

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## Theoretical Relationships

### Kantian Duty Orientation and Abusive Supervision

Kantian duty orientation is theoretically related to abusive supervision from a deonance theory perspective. In a nutshell, drawing on bounded rationality, which is the result of environmental constraints (Simon, 1972), Folger and colleagues argued that in social exchange, there is a bounded autonomy constrained by a social environment in which individuals would accept social norms that are perceived to be legitimate and justifiable (Folger et al., 2013). Bounded autonomy is then enforced by moral ought forces (Heider, 1958), which Folger and colleagues conceptualized as connotative and contributive (Folger & Stein, 2017).

High KDO supervisors' actions are not only contributive to the organization or its members but connotative to the supervisors themselves as decent human beings. Therefore, supervisors with high KDO are less likely to abuse their subordinates because both connotative and contributive forces are at play (Graso et al., 2019). Moreover, abusive supervision is based on interactional justice literature, which stresses the importance of employees' due respect and dignity. Therefore, based on both theoretical and conceptual reasons, I hypothesize.

**Kantian Duty Orientation and Interpersonal Relationships**

Under the assumption that there are often conflicts and uncertainties in social relationships, Kant (1991, p. 265) argued that being a person with a duty to respect others has broader implications in social intercourse. Individuals are attracted to people with principles because they have the potential to not only establish but also maintain long-term relationships. The duty to respect others' dignity is reciprocal because it is always the same in not carrying out disrespectful behaviors. Reciprocity is the first principle in social exchange theory (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). High KDO individuals, including leaders and members, are more likely to build and maintain high-quality relationships. This conceptual connection to social exchange theory allows KDO to be applied in a more general organizational context, including leader-member exchange (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Therefore, I hypothesize:

**Kantian Duty Orientation and Interpersonal Deviance**

KDO also provides value as a trait moderator in organizational research, particularly in mitigating interpersonal deviance (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Because KDO tends to counter norm violation, regardless of whether such behaviors are

constructive or destructive (Warren, 2003). Drawing on deonance theory, I posit that the mitigating effects of employee KDO are robust as it can affect both affective and cognitive mechanisms. Deonance theory uses anger to operationalize its multi-directional and multi-dimensional nature (Folger, 2001; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). Therefore, anger is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of the theory. KDO can be integrated into multiple stages of a deonance model. For example, KDO can operate after we feel angry toward someone whose deed does not deserve our respect. However, high KDO individuals will still withhold harsh criticism or punishment to throw a veil of love over others' true faults, not by softening our judgments but by keeping these judgments to themselves (Kant, 1991, p. 258).

Alternatively, social hierarchy is assumed in moral anger (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010), such that the anger is directed at the supervisor in deonance research (Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth et al., 2017; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). To high KDO individuals, their actions are impersonal (Heider, 1958). One of the differences between discrete emotions and affects is target specificity (Cropanzano et al., 2011), high KDO employee's emotional responses are less target-specific, which could reduce their intensity.

Lastly, the third-party perspective in deonance and various conceptual models (O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011) seem out of necessity to operationalize morality. Because it is safe to assume that third parties are free to do nothing (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), their actions can be attributed to moral rather than instrumental motives (Weiner, 2006). However, while a third-party perspective provides moral specificity, it also limits the contexts of moral behaviors to be studied. For example, employees who are the direct victims of personal harm could also be motivated by a moral duty to correct the

wrongdoings (Aquino et al., 2001). KDO does not rely on a third-party perspective, as counter-inclination is built into the construct.

Based on existing research, interpersonal deviance is often associated with negative emotions (Hoobler & Hu, 2013), social learning (Lian et al., 2012), labeling the supervisor as an abuser (Lount et al., 2022), and moral-exclusion of abused coworker (Mitchell et al., 2015). These affective and cognitive antecedents have all been previously studied by abusive supervision or deonance theory researchers and best fit the KDO conceptualization. Therefore, I hypothesize:

## Development and Validation of The Kantian Duty Orientation Scale

### Overview

In seven studies, I validated the Kantian duty orientation scale, which followed the iterative process suggested by Hinkin (1998). I also used the scale development process of other organizational behavior constructs as references. I used abusive supervision for item generation (Tepper, 2000); duty orientation (Hannah et al., 2014), deontic justice (Beugre, 2012), and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) for scale structure and parameters of statistical analysis; and core-self evaluations (Judge et al., 2003), and the organization-based self-esteem for their organization-centric processes (Pierce et al., 1989). All studies were pre-registered except the confirmatory factor analysis, which used the alumni sample (study 2a). A summary of the studies is shown in Table 2.

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Insert Table 2 about here

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### Items Generation

Arrogance, defame, and ridicule were behaviors mentioned in the abusive supervision scale either directly or indirectly (Tepper, 2000). Therefore, the main contribution of the KDO scale is to identify the contexts where these behaviors occurred in the organizational context (Colquitt et al., 2019). To reach this end, I asked undergraduate students in a business ethics class in the northeastern region of the United States to answer five questions (most are commuter students with job experience). The questions are: *(1) What does employee dignity mean to you? (2) as an observer of others' interactions in a business environment, give an example of how an employee's dignity was respected; (3) As an observer of others' interaction in a business environment, give an example of how an employee's dignity was disrespected; (4) give an example about how your dignity at work was respected. If you have never worked, use the school as the context; (5) give an example of how your dignity at work was disrespected. If you have never worked, use the school as the context.*

Third-seven students provided answers to all questions. I then reviewed the answers with a senior organizational behavior researcher. I identified three common contexts that applied to the three behaviors: feedback giving (e.g., a professor uses a student's failed exam as an example to show to the entire class and makes fun of the student's mistakes), identity issue (e.g., receiving inappropriate comments or special treatment due to gender, race, and religion), and ignorance (e.g., manager or coworker ignore the employee suggestions).

I then developed an initial pool of 18 items, which I presented at a departmental seminar at the same university. Among the attendees are over 30 senior and junior faculty members and doctoral students with backgrounds in qualitative study, research methods,

and moral philosophy. In the hour-long seminar, the attendees were given the conceptualization of KDO and helped assess the items' content and face validity. Based on their feedback, the items were then revised. For example, the items related to making self-sacrifices and respecting others at personal expense were revised, which may confound with moral courage (Hannah et al., 2011) and self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965).

## Study 1.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis

### *Sample and Procedure*

The author is bilingual, and the KDO scale has both an English and a Chinese version, which was validated in parallel for exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Participants were 200 employees recruited on Prolific to validate the English survey and 200 employees recruited on Sojump to validate the Chinese survey. Except for demographic variables, only the 18 items measuring KDO were included in the survey to maximize effort, plus one additional attention-check item (It is important you pay attention to this study. Select Strongly disagree for this item.).

Twenty-five participants failed the attention check in the US sample, and 38 failed the attention check in the Chinese sample. The final sample size for EFA analysis is N=175 and N=162, but results did not change with or without omitting the participants failing the attention check. The medium age group in the US sample is 18-29, which accounts for 72% of the sample, and 129 or 73.7% are females. The medium age group in the Chinese sample is 30-39, which accounts for 50.6% of the sample, and 86 or 53.1% are female.

### *Results*

EFA was conducted using Promax rotation and principal axis factoring (Hannah et al., 2014). In the US sample, parallel analysis and scree plot both suggest there are three

factors in the data. In the Chinese sample, the scree plot suggests six factors and parallel analysis suggests one. After several iterations of EFA, item-level correlational, and internal consistency assessment (DeVellis, 2016), the KDO scale was reduced to eight items and two factors. As an iterative process, studies 4, 5, and 6 indicate that only one factor has empirical/predictive validity, which lead the final scale to be revised as a six-item unidimensional scale. The Cronbach's alphas for the six-item KDO scale are 0.83 for the US sample and 0.72 for the Chinese sample.

**Study 1.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

To minimize sample-specific measuring error and to assess the external validity of the scale, I conducted two CFAs using two organizational samples (Hinkin, 1998). The first sample consists of 97 alums from a large Chinese university. The author contacted the participants and asked them to complete the anonymous survey. In total, 97 completed the 8-item KDO scale survey (besides demographic variables, no other variables were included), which meets the 10 participants per item ratio requirement (DiStefano & Hess, 2005). Results indicate two items: "*I believe employees have an inalienable right to dignity, regardless of their organizational positions.*" and "*I always respect others in confrontations, even when I am extremely unsatisfied with them.*" have correlated errors with several items. I posit that the cause may be ambiguous positions, and *confrontations* may be a relatively rare event. Therefore, the contexts were revised to "*even for those at the lower-level positions*" and "*even when I think they are clearly wrong.*"

Due to this modification, I conducted another CFA using a sample from two Chinese organizations: one in the service industry and one in the information technology industry (N=258, mean age is 36.71, and 134 are female). No other variables were collected

except demographics. The revised items no longer exhibit large numbers of correlated errors in the new scale. The CFA model fit indices of the 6-item KDO scale across multiple samples are shown in Table 3.

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Insert table 3 about here

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**Study 1.3: Concurrent Validity Testing**

I used structural equation models (SEM) to evaluate the concurrent validity of the KDO scale. Specifically, when items measuring KDO and its convergent variables were each loaded onto their corresponding latent factor, the composite reliability (CR) should exceed 0.7, and the average variance extracted (AVE) should exceed 0.5. The square root of KDO's AVE should also be larger than correlations between KDO and convergent variables to establish the discriminant validity between KDO and related convergent variables (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

In addition to the SEM approach, which only uses the theoretically related variables and establishes convergent and discriminant validity at the same time, organizational researchers also use the correlational-based approach to evaluate concurrent validity (Peter, 1981; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1994). To establish concurrent validity using the correlational approach, KDO should have significant and above medium effect size correlations with theoretically related variables (>.5) and below medium (<.5) correlations with theoretically unrelated variables. Therefore, I added theoretically unrelated variables to the data collection.

***Sample and Procedure***

I recruited 300 US participants on Prolific (excluded participants from study 1).

The medium age group is 25-34, and 62% of the sample is female. The same participant pool was surveyed ten months later to assess the test-retest reliability and predictive validity for study 6.

***Measures***

Besides the KDO scale (α = .82), I included several conceptually related constructs, including the 18-item ***deontic justice scale*** (Beugre, 2012), an example item is "I have a moral obligation to treat others fairly." (α = .97); the 12-item ***duty orientation scale*** (Hannah et al., 2014), an example item is "I put the interests of my team ahead of my personal interests." (α = .90); the 10-item ***moral identity scale*** (Aquino & Reed, 2002), an example item is "It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics." (α = .84); the 8-item ***moral disengagement scale*** (Moore et al., 2012), an example item is "It's okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about." (α = .84); the 6-item ***ethical formalism standards of judgement*** (Love et al., 2020), an example item is "solutions to ethical problems are usually black and white." (α = .78), and the 4-item ***prosocial motivation scale*** (Grant, 2008), an example item is "Because I care about benefiting others through my work." (α = .98).

To allow null relationships (Hinkin, 1998), I also included the ten items measuring the ***social desirability scale*** (Steenkamp et al., 2010), an example item is "I sometimes tell lies if I have to." (α = .97); the 10-item ***Rosenberg self-esteem scale*** (Rosenberg, 1965), an example item is "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself." (α = .94); and the 24-item ***locus of control scale*** (Levenson, 1981). An example item is "whether or not I get to be a leader is mostly on my ability." (α = .78).

***Results***

Results indicate the KDO scale passed the discriminant validity test but has a lower than optimal AVE (.42<.50). Because the AVE is an indicator of sufficient variance for the items to converge into a single construct, Fornell and Larcker (1981) argued that if CR (.80 in the study) is above .60, AVE less than .5 is acceptable, as some scale items may have lower item-total correlation by design (e.g., if the reverse-coded items were removed from the six-item KDO scale, the AVE meets the .5 threshold). The correlations between KDO and social desirability (r=.31, p<.001), self-esteem (r=.23, p<.01), and locus of control (r=-.12, p>.05) were all below the .6 cutoff, which implies KDO can be distinguished from these unrelated variables (Penny et al., 2016). Because the CR and AVE indices are only meaningful if the variables are conceptually related. I did not include the unrelated variables in the results shown in Table 4.

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Insert Table 4 about here

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**Study 1.4: Test-retest Reliability and Predictive Validity Testing**

***Sample and Procedure***

For dispositional construct, Judge et al. (2003) suggests it is necessary to evaluate the scale's stability by assessing the scale's test-retest reliability and single-rater reliability, or ICC2 (Koo & Li, 2016). Study 4 drew from the Study 3 sample pool with a 10-month gap, which allowed me to evaluate the temporal consistency of the KDO as a trait construct.

***Measures***

To assess the test-retest reliability, ***subordinates' Kantian Duty Orientation*** was collected at times 1 ($\alpha$ = .87) and 2 ($\alpha$ = .82).

The following variables were collected at time 2 to assess the predictive validity.

***Supervisors' Kantian Duty Orientation*** was collected at time two and reported by the subordinates as a perceived measure (α = .92)

***Abusive supervision*** was reported by subordinates and measured using the 15-item abusive supervision scale (Tepper, 2000). An example item is "my supervisor ridicules me." (α = .92).

***Supervisor and coworker-directed deviance*** were both measured with a 10-item scale developed by Mitchell and Ambrose (2007). The scale had the time frame of "over the past year," and an example item is "I made fun of my supervisor (α = .88) or a coworker (α = .85) at work".

***Workplace negative affect*** was measured with a scale developed by Watson et al. (1988). The item stem is "Over the past year, part of my job (e.g., the work, coworkers, supervisor, clients, pay) has made me feel …" and an example item is "afraid." (α = .92).

***The likelihood of rewards*** was measured with a scale developed by Lian et al. (2012). The item stem is "To what extent will you be rewarded in your organization for engaging in each of the following behaviors?" and an example item is "ridiculing a coworker." (α = .95).

***Abuse labeling*** was measured with a scale developed by Lount et al. (2022). An example item is "I would describe my supervisor as abusive." (α = .98).

***Coworker exclusion belief*** was measured with a scale developed by Mitchell et al. (2015). The item stem is "think of a coworker you work with, who constantly has conflicts with others, or harm the organization or other individuals. If none is available, try to imagine working with such a person." and an example item is "It is OK to treat this coworker unfairly." (α = .91).

***Results***

For test-retest reliability and single-random-raters' reliabilities (ICC2), there is a moderate correlation coefficient between the KDO scale measured at time one and at time two ($r=.65$, $p<.01$) and a moderate ICC2=.62. Therefore, in terms of test-retest reliability, and single-random-raters' reliabilities, results indicate the KDO scale is a reliable and stable measure of KDO.

Using OLS linear regression, results from study 4 (H1) and study 5 (H2) were replicated in study 6, such that supervisor KDO is negatively related to abusive supervision ($b=-.52$, $p<.01$), with the same covariates as study 4 (subordinates' KDO, moral identity, and duty orientation; gender dissimilarity were also included to allow null hypothesis and is not significant), and LMX ($b=-.12$, $p<.05$). Therefore, both supervisor self-reported (study 4) and subordinate-report (study 6) supervisor KDO were significantly and negatively related to abusive supervision which supported H1 and provided evidence that KDO is a criterion valid measure.

Using the same covariates in study 5, subordinates' KDO is now marginally significant in predicting LMX ($b=.27$, $p<.10$). However, after adding abusive supervision as a covariate, results indicate that when supervisor KDO is also included in the model, the subordinates KDO is still marginally significant but in the negative direction ($b=-.19$, $p<.10$), and supervisor's KDO is positively significant ($b=.54$, $p<.01$). Collinearities were assessed but not an issue in the model. This partially rejects H2 but suggests that hierarchy plays a role in the effects of KDO and LMX. Lastly, H3 and H4 were supported, that subordinates' KDO negatively moderated the positive relationships between affective and cognitive antecedents on interpersonal deviance with incremental predictive predictability.

Regression results of H3 and H4 are shown in Table 5.

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Insert Table 5 about here

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## Chapter Discussion

To conclude, this chapter conceptualized the construct of Kantian duty orientation and developed a partial nomological network to hypothesize its effects in organizational behavior research. I also introduced a relatively reliable, valid, and user-friendly scale to measure KDO. Defining a construct and validating a measure is an iterative process (Hinkin, 1998). While further replication is needed, most of the pre-registered hypotheses were supported in this paper, making me feel that KDO is a relatively straightforward construct that has added value to existing research.

Previous research has suggested that the calculative and often self-interest-driven mechanisms could lead to third-party inactions (Polman, 2012; Skarlicki et al., 2015). For example, Peltokorpi (2019) found that for high power distance individuals, abusive supervision increases interaction avoidance. Applying the notion to the third parties, it is likely they will default to inaction due to the power difference with the abusive supervisor or even become abusers themselves (Lian et al., 2012). However, based on findings in this chapter, KDO provides a moral, rather than a value-based psychological explanation for such inaction. Because third parties' reactions will often result in disrespectful behaviors (Mitchell et al., 2015), for high KDO individuals, an eye for an eye will not satisfy the impersonal principle (I shall treat my friends and my enemies the same way); or as reflected in the empirical effects, an eye for an eye is only evident for third parties with lower KDO levels.

One limitation of the development process of the KDO scale is that additional constructs that overlap with KDO may be missing in the validation process. For example, while KDO is focused on duty, dignity is also an essential part of the conceptualization, and existing measures of perceived dignified treatment at work could affect duty as an exchange process (Thomas & Lucas, 2019; Tiwari & Sharma, 2019).

In terms of practical implications, KDO's strength is in its practicality. The disrespectful behaviors are explicit in Kant's conceptualization, so it would also be evident for organizations to disavow arrogance (putting people down), defame (criticizing in public), and ridicule (fault seeking and mockery) in their code of conduct. Employee dignity is also an overarching concept that joins Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI). So, KDO is an organizational diagnostic tool that allows the organization to survey its existing employees and identify pathways to make the initiatives more effective. Lastly, assuming unethical conduct, particularly interpersonal mistreatment, is at times unintentional, KDO could be used as a behavioral intervention for both the leaders and employees to facilitate their future encounters with others better.

## CHAPTER 5: THEORY TESTING

Two field survey studies were conducted to test the proposed theoretical model and corresponding hypotheses. The goal is to test the proposed model with different samples to see if the results are robust, with improved measures of the supervisor-challenging behaviors in study 3 to align with existing research. The scales used in studies 2 and 3 are listed in Appendix A, and the R code and output of the model testing are included in Appendix B.

### Study 2

## Sample and Procedure

Data was collected from 16 organizations in China in the financial, information technology, education, retail, recruitment, and manufacturing sectors. The data was collected as part of a larger data collection effort conducted by a researcher not affiliated with the current project. Employees completed three surveys for this study, and there is a one-month gap between time one and time two surveys, as well as a two-week gap between time two and time 3, at the organizations' request to conclude the studies as soon as possible. The two-week interval was deemed sufficient to minimize the common variance bias (Johnson et al., 2011).

## Measures

As a native Chinese speaker fluent in English, I conducted the translation-back-translation with rounds of revisions based on feedback and comments from bilingual colleagues to improve the conceptual clarity of the survey items and organizational contacts to improve their readability.

Because the surveys are longitudinal and some unrelated scales to the current study were also included in the surveys, the time two and three variables have the prompt "In the previous survey, we asked how often your supervisor engaged in a list of behaviors against a coworker such as ridicules them, telling their thoughts or feelings are stupid, putting them down in front of other, makes negative comments about them to other, and tells them they are incompetent. Now, please answer to what extent the following statements describe your feelings/actions." All scales are measured on a 7-point scale and in frequencies (1-almost never, 7-always), except the variables measuring emotions (1-not at all, 7-extremely).

Kantian duty orientation was measured using the four-item respecting dignity

dimension from the first iteration of the Duty to Dignity Scale. As previously discussed, this dimension was retained in the final scale as the only dimension with empirical validity in the validation studies. The scale is measured as the frequency with the prompt "When interacting with my coworkers, I …" and an example item is "Respect others' dignity, even when I think they are clearly wrong" (α = .92).

(Utilitarian) Duty orientation was measured using the twelve items scale from Hannah et. al., (2014). An example item is "put the interests of my team ahead of my personal interests" (α = .93).

Observed abusive supervision was measured using a shortened five-item version of the Tepper (2000) scale by Mitchell and Ambrose (2007) and were widely used by third-party responses to OAS research (Priesemuth, 2012; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). A sample item is 'My supervisor ridicules my coworker' (α = .98).

Outrage towards the supervisor was measured using the two items from Priesemuth and Schminke (2019), which they adapted from the deontic justice scale (Beugre, 2012). The items are 'My supervisor's behaviors make me very angry' and 'I feel resentment towards my supervisor for how he/she behaves' (α = .95).

Empathic concern towards abused coworkers was measured using a three-item scale adapted from Davis (1980). The three items are: 'my supervisor's behaviors towards my coworker make me feel concerned for my coworker,' 'my supervisor's behaviors towards my coworker make me feel sorry for my coworker,' and 'I feel sympathetic to my coworker's suffering for how he/she was treated by my supervisor' (α = .94).

Standing up to supervisor was measured using the standing-up behavior scale developed by Priesemuth (2012). A sample item is 'I would approach my supervisor about

his/her behavior even if it may put me in an uncomfortable position.' (α = .97).

Coworker support was measured using a three-item scale based on the support scale Westring and Ryan (2010) created, which had been used by Mitchell et al. (2015) in their study on third-party reactions to abusive supervision. The items are 'I had provided the coworker with emotional support,' 'I had provided the coworker with help to handle the situation with the supervisor,' and 'I had listened to my coworker's concerns or problems with the supervisor.' (α = .92).

Moral identity was collected as a control variable and measured using the five items' internationalization dimension from the moral identity scale developed by Aquino & Reed (2002). Studies that focus on third-party reactions to unethical behaviors often use the five items measuring the internationalization dimension because it best captures the degree to which people's moral trait associations are experienced as being central to one's self-definition (O'Reilly, 2013, p. 39). Moral identity measures the self-rated importance of having a set of moral traits; a sample item is 'it would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics, and the set of nine moral traits, including caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, hardworking, helpful, honest, and kind (α = .97).

Self-experienced abusive supervision was also collected as a potential control variable using the same five items from the adapted abusive supervision scale (Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007) with the referent being the self (α = .97). The variables' means, standard deviations, and correlations are shown in Table 1.

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Insert Table 8 about here

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**Results**

Using path analysis, I follow the recommendations from Hayes (2022, pp. 259-263) and Preacher et al. (2007, p. 192) to enter all variables simultaneously as a fully specified model. As documented in Appendix B, moral identity did not change the results and was not included in the final reporting.

Contrary to the hypothesized positive relationship in hypotheses 1 and 2, both Kantian duty orientation ($b=-.20$, $p<.05$) and Utilitarian duty orientation ($b=-.19$, $p<.05$) have a significantly negative relationship with observed abusive supervision, with the contrasting effects of Kantian and Utilitarian duty orientation on observed abusive supervision being rejected (H3; $b=-.01$, $p>.05$). Because of the negative relationship between KDO and OAS, the mediating effects KDO and outrage via OAS (H4; $b=-.04$, $p<.05$), KDO and supervisor challenging behaviors via OAS (H5; $b=-.08$, $p<.05$), and the sequential mediating effects (H6; $b=-.004$, $P<.10$) were all significant but in the negative direction. In the UDO path, only the UDO on coworker support via OAS relationship was significant (H8; $b=-.03$, $p<.05$). Because studies 2 and 3 share the same theoretical and analytical structure, with only minor differences in measurements, I consolidate the results from both studies 2 and 3 into Table 9 for accessibility and comparison purposes.

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Insert Table 9 about here

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**Study 2 Discussion**

Overall, results from Study 2 did not support the hypotheses. However, post-hoc analysis suggests there could be a theoretical rather than methodological reason behind the

results because the sample produced results consistent with previous research. First, the prosocial deonance model proposed by Priesemuth and Schminke (2019) was replicated in study 2 as outrage mediates third parties observed abusive supervision on supervisor challenging behaviors (b=.02, se=.01). On the other hand, the nonsignificant indirect effects of observed abusive supervision on coworker support via empathy (Hu et al., 2022) was also replicated in study 2 (b=-.001, se=.01).

Regarding the proposed model, significantly negative effects were found for both Kantian Duty Orientation (b=-.20, se=.08) and Duty Orientation (b=-.19, se=.09). Because the model was estimated as a fully identified model, the results indicate that Kantian and Utilitarian duty orientations do have independent effects on the perception of the abusive supervisor of coworkers, with third parties' duty orientations tend to reduce, rather than increase the reporting of such tendencies. However, the robustness of the finding would need further evaluation for different reasons.

First, the main surprise from Study 2 is the negative effects between duty orientations and observed abusive supervision. These negative effects can result from priming or common variance bias, and a remedy would be temporally separating the observed abusive supervision from the two trait-based duty-orientation constructs, which conceptually should not change over a short period, such as between surveys.

Second, both standing up to supervisor and coworker support are prosocial. So, using the two dependent variables did not fully capture the bandwidth of the deonance theory being multidirectional (Folger & Stein, 2017), which was tested using supervisor-directed deviance (Mitchell et al., 2015). Whereas the moral outrage measure in study 2 was adapted from Priesemuth and Schminke (2019), Mitchell et al. (2015) used a three-

item measure of outrage, which seems to tap into different dimensions of anger. Because I planned to measure the dependent variables (supervisor-directed deviance) from the Mitchell et al. study, I also used their anger measure to align with their research.

Lastly, in the supplementary analysis documented in Appendix B, the model estimates in Study 2 seem to be robust when I restrict the sample to employees who have experience with abusive supervision of coworkers (observed abusive supervision >1). However, the results are susceptible to individual-level covariates, such that many hypotheses were no longer supported when either moral identity or self-abusive supervision was included.

## Study 3

### Sample and Procedure

I collected data from 17 organizations in the manufacturing, trade, information technology, and finance sectors in China with the help of a local researcher who is not affiliated with the current project. Master of Business Administration Students from a midsized Chinese university served as organizational contacts. Participation was voluntary, confidentiality of the responses was maintained, and no financial incentives were provided.

Employees filled out online surveys at three points in time. I preregistered a two-week delay between the survey gaps. However, because the study was launched right after the holiday season, many participants requested more time to finish the surveys. Therefore, while there was a two-week gap between the Wave 1 and 2 surveys, there was a three-week gap between the Wave 2 and 3 surveys, and participants had up to four weeks to complete Wave 3. After listwise deletion, the final size is 388. Among the participants, 60% were female, and the average age was 35.6 years (SD = 7.15).

Study 3 also has some minor differences compared to study 2. First, the variables of KDO were measured using the final 6-item scale, compared to the 4-item version in Study 2. Second, to address the potential conceptual issue mentioned in the discussion of study 2, KDO and UDO were measured in time 2. Lastly, in terms of the Kantian duty orientation related path, both anger and the supervisor's challenging behavior were measured using scales from Mitchell et al. (2015). Lastly, to check how much of an impact self-experienced abusive supervision has on the model, I collected the variable both in time one and time three.

**Measures**

All measures are consistent with study 2, except:

Kantian duty orientation was measured using the six-item Duty to Dignity Scale. The scale is measured as the frequency with the prompt "When interacting with my coworkers, I …" and an example item is "Respect others' dignity, even when I think they are clearly wrong" ($\alpha = .75$).

Moral outrage toward the abusive supervisor was measured using three items from (Mitchell et al., 2015). The items are angry, irritated, and annoyed toward the supervisor upon witnessing (or were to witness) the abusive supervision of coworkers. ($\alpha = .95$).

Supervisor challenging behavior was measured using the 10-item supervisor-directed deviance scale from Mitchell and Ambrose (2007). An example item is "Made fun of my supervisor at work." ($\alpha = .97$).

The reliabilities for variables that remain the same: duty orientation ($\alpha = .92$), observed abusive supervision ($\alpha = .96$), empathy ($\alpha = .96$), coworker support ($\alpha = .87$), moral identity ($\alpha = .96$), time one abusive supervision ($\alpha = .96$), and time three abusive

supervision ($\alpha = .95$),

Means, standard deviations, and correlations are shown in Table 10.

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Insert Table 10 about here

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**Results**

I again follow the recommendation from Hayes (2022, pp. 259-263) and Preacher et al. (2007, p. 192) to enter all variables simultaneously as a fully specified model. Consistent with study 2, results indicate there is a negative relationship between duty orientation and observed abusive supervision, with observed abusive supervision mediating the relationships between duty orientation and empathy, as well as coworker support, but not a sequential mediation relationship as hypothesized.

On the other hand, there are no longer significant relationships between the Kantian duty orientation and the path of supervisor-directed deviance. Coefficients for the hypotheses from both studies 2 and 3 are shown in Figure 2, which also includes the additional parameter estimates.

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Insert Figure 2 about here

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**Study 3 Discussion**

Where the pattern seems to persist in both 2 and 3 in terms of the negative relationships between duty orientations and observed abusive supervision, the Kantian duty orientation-related path is no longer significant in study 3. However, because the well-

estimated mediation relationship was also not significant (b=.000, se=.001), the results in study 3 could be due to a sample-specific issue.

# CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION

## Summary

This dissertation is based on the very basic proposition that individuals differ in their duty orientations, not merely on the conviction (i.e., level of duty), but also on the objects of duty. Because moral duties in normative theories are divided into Kantian and Utilitarian traditions, third-party duty orientations could explain how they react to mistreatment in organizations. I then construct a theoretical framework, which is primarily based on existing research, to explain how the processes may work. Specifically, why duty orientations could affect our perceptions of workplace mistreatment, how they make us feel, and ultimately, lead to our behavioral responses.

There is a gap in the current literature to capture Kantian duty orientation, which focuses on the right to be respected for individual dignity. In testing the theoretical model, I first defined, developed, and validated a measure of Kantian duty orientation. In a three-year effort that involved multiple studies and samples, the iterative process made the construct reasonably clear, and I am confident that the construct does offer some added value to organizational behavioral research, and its scale is reliable and valid.

## Limitations and Future Directions

Both field studies used samples from Chinese organizations. Cultural values tend to have an impact on abusive supervision-related consequences (Lian et al., 2012), and the external validity of the findings needs to be evaluated using samples from other cultures. Bond (2004) has long suggested cultures as a set of affordances and constraints that channel

the expression of coercive means of social control by self and others. It is very likely that cultural values are the boundary conditions or the mechanisms that explain the moral passivity we observe the third parties exhibit in this dissertation.

Although the findings that individuals with higher duty orientations are associated with moral passivity than activeness do seem consistent with the samples used in the scale development process, I utilized samples from both the US and China. This only raises further questions: Do third parties' cultural values precede their duty orientation-related inaction, or was it simply an affordance issue? For example, for Chinese third parties it could be the case they want to speak up because they deeply care about the coworker as a horizontal collectivist (Chen et al., 1997), yet the high power distance organizational culture does not afford them to do so (Chen et al., 1998). In contrast, there are many opportunities for third parties to act in Western organizations (Miceli et al., 2008), they may not take actions as high vertical individualism would suggest that they believe the abused coworker should take care of their own business (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Whereas not precisely a limitation, this dissertation was undertaking the task of answering two questions: Do the third parties respond to observed mistreatment, and why do they respond? Whereas removing participants reporting they never witnessed abusive supervisors or coworkers allowed me to focus on the second question, which did not change the results in study 2, it did in study 3. This implies that the action versus inaction debate in the third-party paradigm may be more of the contextual question where different theories could both be correct, with the difference being their theoretical questions (Folger & Glerum, 2015). Therefore, there may be some benefits to testing the model using the critical incident report method in the future, as it was widely used in most third-party response

research. However, it has to be carefully designed as duty orientations could have a very strong priming effect with the recall of some morally charged event.

While this dissertation focuses on third parties, duty orientations have the property of being impersonal and university, so they should operate very similarly, even with the focal referent of the abusive victim being the self. This would greatly expand our research spectrum as some morally questionable events, such as sexual harassment, often occur without third-party knowledge (Magley et al., 1999), and they share very close conceptual features with abusive supervision (Tepper et al., 2017). Suppose the pattern of negative relationship between duty orientations and perception of mistreatment holds in such context. In that case, it can help us better understand why some victims are not standing forward to report their abusers.

Lastly, there may be some value added to consolidate the emotional responses to observed abusive supervision. For example, instead of covering a range of emotions as in this dissertation, one can consolidate the emotions as they are all negative in nature (empathy to suffering is negative). One candidate with both the bandwidth and theoretical clarity to answer the research questions raised by this dissertation is the cognitive-neoassociationistic model (CNM). In a long-time effort to theorize a general model of aggression, Berkowitz (1990, 2014) argues that aversive events first generate negative affect, which in turn activates the associative network of specific types of feelings, physiological reactions, motor responses, and thoughts and memories, which are all interconnected. This framework may explain intra-personal variance in our emotional responses to observed mistreatment.

## Theoretical Implications

Although the hypothesized model is not fully supported in both field studies, several theoretical reasons could explain these results. First, Kantian duty orientation is proscriptive, which emphasizes NOT disrespecting others, including the wrongdoers and aggressors (Kant, 2015). Another possible reason is that the positive correlations between KDO and UDO could indicate employees' inner struggles that made them indecisive. Lastly, there could be another methodological issue, such as the sample participants being Chinese within Chinese organizations, whereas the theoretical frameworks used to analyze third-party responses had often been Western-oriented.

More broadly speaking, this dissertation highlights the complex third-party, victim, and aggressor relationships in organizations. In the interest of establishing non-instrumental (i.e., moral) motives, previous third-party studies have generally assumed or created situations in which the third party has little stake in what they observe, thereby making standing up to the aggressor less challenging (Mitchell et al., 2015; Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019). Since both KDO and UDO are deeply situated in organizations, the complex relationships that the third party has with the aggressor and the victim may account for the inaction. This argument is consistent with the theory and research on organizational silence and the challenges of promoting voice in organizations (Morrison, 2014).

Conceptually, Kantian and Utilitarian duty orientations are prosocial and socially desirable. While taking with a grain of salt the empirical results in this dissertation as two organizational studies are far from enough to establish conclusions, existing empirical research also indicates on the correlational level, having some forms of moral conviction, such as formalism and utilitarianism does not lead to heightened moral awareness (Reynolds, 2006). There is also evidence in the third-party responses paradigm that moral

identity also does not correlate significantly to the perception of and the emotional and behavioral responses to observed abusive supervision (Mitchell et al., 2015), or even at times shown either nonsignificant negative (Priesemuth & Schminke, 2019), or significantly negative relationships to observed coworker mistreatment and emotional responses (Lin & Loi, 2019). While not precisely duty-oriented, this does indicate that moral constructs do not robustly lead to moral actions.

Theoretically, the inaction position is best theorized by the protected value theory and omission bias research (Baron & Ritov, 2004, 2009). However, even assuming the omission position is valid, there is still some uncertainty about the precise nature of these effects manifesting in the context of the third party to observe mistreatment. For example, the classical argument from omission bias for inaction is that duty could create infinite obligations and, therefore, infeasible. While this perhaps is one of the contributions KDO makes, as the duty to not disrespect others is feasible, study 2 does suggest that both the feasible KDO and non-feasible duty orientation to organizations have significant and independent relationships on the perceptions of some reactions to observed mistreatment.

In other words, Kantian and Utilitarian individuals may discount morally questionable behaviors for different reasons. For the third parties high on Kantian duty orientation, the reason could be that labeling some behaviors as ridicule is not a conclusion they would be ready to draw, as abusive behaviors and abuser labeling are two separate constructs (Lount et al., 2022). However, even assuming high Kantian duty orientation, third parties recognize abuse occurred, they may still refrain from challenging the supervisor because it would first deprive the victim of their opportunity to defend their dignity and could undermine the supervisor’s dignity. As much as morally reprehensive

abusive behaviors are, an eye for an eye is still wrong. For high-duty orientation individuals, this logic dilemma could have prevented them from acting. On the other hand, highly utilitarian duty-oriented third parties may intuitively not perceive some questionable conversations as ridicule, but negative relationships could also be the result of not wanting to share that information with outsiders, such as the researcher. Overall, the KDO concept reveals the complexity of third-party reactions and suggests boundary conditions. Evidence suggests that the normative distinction between Kantian and Utilitarian theories seems to manifest in organizational contexts to the extent that they have different unique effects.

Moreover, there may be some additional effects at play with the observed abusive supervision construct. For example, supervisors were purposely avoid abusing employees in front of these highly duty-oriented individuals to protect themselves as they know they are likely to be challenged; or it could a methodological issue, such as duty-oriented individuals tend to cultivate some ethical work environment on their own. The exact nature of how such effects occur is beyond the scope of this dissertation, with these mechanisms acting independently or collectively to each other.

## Practical Implications

The practical implication of this dissertation is two-fold. First, Kantian Duty Orientation could be a behavioral intervention measure that helps organizations design their ethics training program better. Specifically, it is crucial to educate employees that it is not only the lack of reason that makes some behavior immoral. Often, we do have reasons to criticize another person, but that criticism tends to harm them deeply as they are defenseless to matters of fact. So, it is crucial to recognize that we should still exhibit self-control even in those reasonable situations by providing constructive feedback instead of

destructive criticisms.

On the other hand, organizations should understand why subordinates (not only direct victims but also third-party coworkers) hesitate to stand up against abusive supervisors. Individuals with a higher level of Kantian duty orientation could ask themselves: What if I file a complaint against the supervisor, but I was wrong? Reliance on individual subordinates, thus, is not an effective way to prevent abusive supervision. More effective ways lie in policy and culture that penalize abuse and encourage employee respect and dignity.

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# TABLES

## Table 1. Conceptual Space of Kantian Duty Orientation

| Construct Name | Proscriptive (vs prescriptive) | Dignity (vs worth) | Duty (vs choice) | Behavior (vs. attitude) | Frequency (vs agreement) | Trait (vs. State) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kantian Duty Orientation | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Moral Identity | | | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Deontic Justice | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Ethical Standards of Judgment | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Prosocial Motivation | | | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Duty Orientation | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Moral Disengagement | | | | ✓ | | ✓ |

**Table 2. Summary of Study 1: Samples, Predictions, and Results**

| Study | Methods | Sample | Prediction | Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 – EFA | Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) | 1.1a: 175 Prolific US employees<br>1.1b: 162 Sojump Chinese employees | KDO is a higher-order construct. | Two factors emerged. |
| 1.2 – CFA | Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) | 1.2a: 97 Chinese organization employees<br>1.2b: 258 Chinese organization employees | Two-factor model fits better than the one-factor model | Confirmed |
| 1.3 – Convergent and discriminant validity | Composite Reliability (CR) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) | 299 Prolific US employees | Related yet distinct from deontic justice, duty orientation, moral identity, moral disengagement, formalism, and prosocial motivation. | Confirmed |
| 1.4 – Test-retest reliability, Predictive validity (Ha to Hd) | OLS | 178 Prolific US employees from Study 3 | 1. The KDO scale demonstrates test-retest and single-random-raters' reliability.<br>2. Test H1 to H4. | All confirmed except H2 ($p<.10$). |

**Table 3. Kantian Duty Orientation Scale**

| | Sample [a] | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| **Instruction and Items** | | | | | | | | |
| When interacting with my coworkers, I … | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Respect others' dignity, even when I think they are clearly wrong. | .71 | .60 | .96 | .94 | .85 | .81 | .87 | .86 |
| 2. Treat others with respect, even for people I don't like very much. | .72 | .63 | .94 | .94 | .84 | .81 | .85 | .91 |
| 3. Put people down when criticizing their mistakes. (Reverse scored) | .63 | .53 | .90 | .90 | .71 | .67 | .78 | .22 |
| 4. Try to understand others' points of view, even if I disagree with them. | .78 | .70 | .95 | .95 | .80 | .69 | .85 | .87 |
| 5. Ridicule others when they are at fault. (Reverse scored) | .60 | .58 | .88 | .91 | .69 | .70 | .78 | .26 |
| 6. Value people for who they are when others look down on them. | .77 | .64 | .93 | .94 | .78 | .68 | .88 | .72 |
| **Model Fit Indices [b]** | | | | | | | | |
| Comparative Fit Index (CFI) | .97 | 1.00 | .93 | .98 | .99 | .98 | 1.00 | .95 |
| Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) | .95 | 1.06 | .87 | .97 | .98 | .97 | .99 | .91 |
| The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) | .07 | .00 | .29 | .14 | .07 | .08 | .05 | .14 |
| Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) | .03 | .03 | .02 | .02 | .02 | .03 | .02 | .04 |
| Sample Size | 175 | 162 | 97 | 258 | 299 | 178 | 559 | 432 |

[a] Samples: 1. Study 1.1a-Prolific; 2. Study 1.1b-Sojump; 3. Study 1.2a-Alumni; 4. Study 1.2b-Employees; 5. Study 1.3-Prolific (T1); 6. Study 1.4- Prolific (T2). 7. Study 2, 8. Study 3.

[b] Correlated errors were allowed between items 3 and 5 in all model estimates. No other modification was made.

**Table 4. Convergent and Discriminant Validity Results (Study 1.3)**

| Variable | CR | AVE | Square root of AVE | Correlations | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | KDO | DJ | ESJ | MD | MI | PM |
| Kantian Duty Orientation [a] | 0.8 | 0.42 | 0.65 | | | | | | |
| Deontic Justice | 0.97 | 0.65 | 0.81 | 0.62 | | | | | |
| Ethical Standards of Judgement | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.64 | -0.19 | -0.09 | | | | |
| Moral Disengagement | 0.87 | 0.46 | 0.68 | -0.54 | -0.5 | 0.35 | | | |
| Moral Identity | 0.83 | 0.37 | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.64 | 0.08 | -0.31 | | |
| Prosocial Motivation | 0.98 | 0.93 | 0.96 | 0.29 | 0.37 | 0.24 | -0.13 | 0.51 | |
| Duty Orientation | 0.92 | 0.48 | 0.69 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.27 | -0.18 | 0.62 | 0.46 |

CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance Extracted, Square root of AVE should be larger than correlations to establish discriminant validity.

[a] KDO was measured at time 1 and 10 months later at time 2. The time 1 measure had stronger evidence for concurrent validity, and the results from time 2 were shown.

**Table 5. Linear Regression Results (Study 1.6 – H1c and H1d)**

| **Independent Variables** | **DV - Supervisor Directed Deviance (H3)** | | | | | | **DV - Coworker Directed Deviance (H4)** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Negative Affect (NA) | .13 ** | .12 ** | .12 ** | 1.43 ** | .12 ** | .11 ** | .10 ** | .10 ** | .09 ** | .51 ** | .10 ** | .09 ** |
| Likelihood of Rewards (LR) | .14 ** | .11 * | .09 | .02 | .46 ** | .05 | .17 ** | .16 ** | .13 ** | .11 * | .62 ** | .09 * |
| Abuser Labeling (AL) | .13 ** | .13 ** | .12 ** | .11 ** | .13 ** | .76 ** | | | | | | |
| Coworker Exclusion (CE) | | | | | | | .05 * | .03 | .02 | .02 | .02 | .58 ** |
| **Control Variables** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Deontic Justice | | -.06 | .00 | .03 | .01 | .02 | | -.15 ** | -.10 * | -.09 * | -.09 * | -.09 * |
| Utilitarian Duty Orientation | | -.02 | .00 | -.02 | .00 | -.01 | | .09 * | .10 ** | .09 * | .09 * | .09 * |
| Moral Identity | | -.01 | -.01 | -.01 | -.01 | .00 | | .04 | .04 | .04 | .04 | .05 |
| Social Desirability | | -.04 | -.03 | -.05 | -.03 | -.03 | | -.04 | -.04 | -.04 | -.04 | -.06 |
| **Moderating Variable** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kantian Duty Orientation | | | -.17 ** | .29 ** | -.06 | .06 | | | -.14 ** | .01 | .01 | .09 |
| **Interaction Terms** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NA × KDO | | | | -.22 ** | | | | | | -.07 * | | |
| LR × KDO | | | | | -.07 * | | | | | | -.10 ** | |
| AL × KDO | | | | | | -.11 ** | | | | | | |
| CE × KDO | | | | | | | | | | | | -.10 ** |

** p<0.05  ** p<0.01*

**Table 8 – Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients**

| Variables | Mean | S.D. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Kantian Duty Orientation | 5.81 | 0.99 | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Utilitarian Duty Orientation | 5.68 | 0.84 | .63** | | | | | | | |
| 3. Observed Abusive Supervision | 1.73 | 1.30 | -.22** | -.21** | | | | | | |
| 4. Outrage toward Supervisor | 3.16 | 1.81 | -.13** | -.18** | .17** | | | | | |
| 5. Empathy toward Coworker | 4.13 | 1.59 | .01 | -.00 | -.01 | .58** | | | | |
| 6. Standing-up to Supervisor | 2.61 | 1.63 | -.24** | -.25** | .37** | .19** | -.03 | | | |
| 7. Coworker Support | 3.81 | 1.60 | .03 | .06 | .11* | .05 | .05 | .28** | | |
| 8. Moral Identity | 6.13 | 0.98 | .51** | .61** | -.25** | -.16** | -.03 | -.22** | .02 | |
| 9. Abusive Supervision | 1.54 | 1.23 | -.25** | -.20** | .82** | .16** | -.02 | .37** | .13** | -.29** |

** $p<0.05$  ** $p<0.1$*

**Table 9 – Consolidated Hypotheses Testing Results from Studies 2 and 3**

| Hypothesis | Study 2 (N = 503) | | Study 3 (N = 390) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coefficient | Result | Coefficient | Result |
| ***Hypothesis 1***: Kantian duty orientation (KDO) is positively related to observed abusive supervision (OAS) | -.20 [-.36, -.04] | Opposite | -.07 [-.14, .03] | |
| ***Hypothesis 2:*** Utilitarian duty orientation (UDO) is positively related to observed abusive supervision (OAS). | -.19 [-.67, -.01] | Opposite | -.10 [-.19, -.02] | Opposite |
| ***Hypothesis 3:*** KDO is more positively related to OAS than UDO. | -.01 [-.31, .29] | | .04 [-.10, .18] | |
| ***Hypothesis 4:*** OAS mediates the positive relationship between KDO and outrage towards an abusive supervisor. | -.04 [-.10, -.01] | Opposite | -.02 [-.05, .003] | |
| ***Hypothesis 5:*** OAS mediates the positive relationship between KDO and supervisor challenging behaviors. | -.08 [-.16, -.02] | Opposite | -.004 [-.02, .000] | |
| ***Hypothesis 6:*** The positive relationship between KDO and supervisor challenging behaviors is sequentially mediated by OAS and outrage towards the abusive supervisor. | -.004 [-.01, .00] | Opposite | .000 [.000, .000] | |
| ***Hypothesis 7:*** OAS mediates the positive relationship between UDO and empathic concern towards an abused coworker. | .002 [-.02, .03] | | -.03 [-.07, -.01] | Opposite |
| ***Hypothesis 8:*** OAS mediates the positive relationship between UDO and coworker support. | -.03 [-.08, -.002] | Opposite | -.03 [-.07, -.004] | Opposite |
| ***Hypothesis 9:*** The positive relationship between UDO and coworker support is sequentially mediated by OAS and empathic concern towards the abused coworker. | .000 [-.001, .004] | | .001 [-.001, .006] | |

Note.
95% confidence intervals were shown in brackets.
Opposite indicates a significant and opposite effect was found. The non-significant results were omitted to assist readability.

**Table 10 – Study 3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients**

| Variables | Mean | S.D. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Kantian Duty Orientation | 5.51 | 0.92 | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Utilitarian Duty Orientation | 5.47 | 0.85 | .48** | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Observed Abusive Supervision | 1.39 | 0.76 | -.16** | -.18** | | | | | | | |
| 4. Outrage toward Supervisor | 3.60 | 1.69 | .14** | -.01 | .09 | | | | | | |
| 5. Empathy toward Coworker | 3.93 | 1.65 | .22** | .08 | .10* | .81** | | | | | |
| 6. Standing-up to Supervisor | 1.05 | 0.26 | -.22** | -.25** | .26** | .01 | .00 | | | | |
| 7. Coworker Support | 3.62 | 1.39 | .07 | .24** | .11* | .00 | -.01 | .02 | | | |
| 8. Moral Identity | 5.80 | 1.12 | .21** | .39** | -.13** | -.01 | .03 | -.18** | .17** | | |
| 9. Abusive Supervision (T1) | 1.34 | 0.76 | -.15** | -.14** | .75** | .06 | .03 | .25** | .09 | -.24** | |
| 10. Abusive Supervision (T3) | 1.25 | 0.60 | -.21** | -.22** | .52** | .05 | .04 | .37** | .03 | -.13** | .49** |

** $p<0.05$  ** $p<0.1$*

# FIGURES

## Figure 1. Theoretical Model





**Figure 2. Hypothesized Model and Testing Results**




Note. Model testing results from studies 1 and 2 are shown in parentheses separated by the "|" symbol.

# APPENDIX A: KEY SCALES

## A1. Utilitarian Duty Orientation Scale

As organizational members, do employees have obligations they must fulfill to the team and organization they work for? People have different opinions and behave differently. Think about yourself as a member of the organization and rate your level of agreement with each item as it pertains to you as a member. There is no absolute right or wrong answer as long as it reflects truthfully about you.

1. I put the interests of my team ahead of my personal interests.
2. I do all that I can to support the organization.
3. I am faithful to my team members.
4. I am loyal to my leaders and team.
5. I accept personal risk or loss in support of the mission/organization goals.
6. I make personal sacrifices to serve the mission/organization goals.
7. I do whatever it takes to not let the mission/organization goals fail.
8. I get the job done under the toughest conditions.
9. I do what is right always.
10. I demonstrate personal integrity when challenged.
11. I will not accept dishonor.
12. I set the example for honorable behavior for others.

## A2. Moral Identity Scale

Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

CARING, COMPASSIONATE, FAIR, FRIENDLY, GENEROUS, HELPFUL, HARDWORKING, HONEST, KIND

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions.

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
3. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics
4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me
5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics

**A3. Observed Abusive Supervision**

| Over the past year, how often has your supervisor done each of the following to any of your coworkers? |
| --- |
| 1. Ridiculed a coworker. |
| 2. Told a coworker their thoughts or feelings were stupid. |
| 4. Put a coworker down in front of others. |
| 11. Made negative comments about a coworker to others. |
| 14. Told a coworker they are incompetent. |

**A4. Moral Outrage toward the Supervisor**

| |
|---|
| Upon observing your supervisor's behavior towards the coworker, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements |
| 1. My supervisor’s behaviors towards my coworker make me very angry. |
| 2. I felt resentment toward my supervisor for how he/she behaves towards my coworker |

**A5. Standing up to Supervisor (Study 2 Supervisor Challenging Behaviors)**

| |
|---|
| Upon observing your supervisor's behavior towards the coworker, to what extent did you engage in the following behaviors. |
| 1. I approached my supervisor about his/her behavior even if it may put me in an uncomfortable position. |
| 2. I confronted my supervisor even if I might encounter negative consequences |
| 3. I faced up to my supervisor regardless of the risk involved. |
| 4. I met with the supervisor and talk about his/her actions, regardless of any potential negative consequences. |

**A6. Supervisor-directed Deviance (Study 3 Supervisor Challenging Behaviors)**

Over the past year, how often have you used the following behaviors on your supervisor?

1. Made fun of my supervisor at work.
2. Played a mean prank on my supervisor.
3. Made an obscene comment or gesture toward my supervisor.
4. Acted rudely toward my supervisor.
5. Gossiped about my supervisor.
6. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark against my supervisor.
7. Publicly embarrassed my supervisor.
8. Swore at my supervisor.
9. Refused to talk to my supervisor.
10. Said something hurtful to my supervisor at work.

## A7. Empathic Concern Toward Coworker

| Upon observing how your supervisor treated the coworker, to what extent do the following statements describe how you feel towards the coworker |
|---|
| 1. I felt concerned for my coworker. |
| 2. I felt sorrow for my coworker. |
| 3. I felt my coworker's suffering. |

**A8. Coworker Support**

| |
|---|
| Upon observing your supervisor's behavior towards the coworker, to what extent did you engage in the following behaviors. |
| 1. I provided the coworker with emotional support |
| 2. I provided the coworker with help to handle the situation with the supervisor |
| 3. I listened to my coworker's concerns or problems with the supervisor. |

## A9. Kantian Duty Orientation Scale in Chinese

在与公司其他人共事过程中，你做出下列行为的频率是…

(1-从不, 2-很少, 3-偶尔, 4-有时, 5-频繁, 6-通常, 7-总是)

1.尊重他人的尊严，即使我认为他们明显是有错的一方

2.尊重他人，即使是我不太喜欢的人

3.在批评别人的错误时贬低他们

4.试着理解他人的观点，即使我和他们的意见不一致

5.在别人有错的时候嘲笑他们

6.在某人被其他人瞧不起的时候，我也试着发现这个人的内在价值

## APPENDIX B: R Code and Output for Studies 2 and 3

```
Make library(foreign) # read spss
library(dplyr) # data cleaning

##
## Attaching package: 'dplyr'

## The following objects are masked from 'package:stats':
##
##     filter, lag

## The following objects are masked from 'package:base':
##
##     intersect, setdiff, setequal, union

library(psych)
library(apaTables) # for the apa.cor.table function
library(rempsyc) # for the nice_table function

## Suggested APA citation: Thériault, R. (2023). rempsyc: Convenience functions for psychology
.
## Journal of Open Source Software, 8(87), 5466. https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.05466

library(lavaan)

## This is lavaan 0.6-17
## lavaan is FREE software! Please report any bugs.

##
## Attaching package: 'lavaan'

## The following object is masked from 'package:psych':
##
##     cor2cov


# read data
study2_data <- read.spss("Study 2 Data.sav",to.data.frame=TRUE)
study3_data <- read.spss("Study 3 Data.sav",to.data.frame=TRUE)

#########################
# Study 2 data analysis #
#########################

# variable reliabilities
study2_variables = colnames(study2_data)

ddw_items <- select(study2_data,
                    which(study2_variables=="ddw1"):
                      which(study2_variables=="ddw4"))
alpha(ddw_items)$total[1]
```

```
##  raw_alpha
##  0.9172334

do_items <- select(study2_data,
                   which(study2_variables=="udo1"):
                    which(study2_variables=="udo12"))
alpha(do_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9287949

oas_items <- select(study2_data,
                    which(study2_variables=="oas1"):
                     which(study2_variables=="oas5"))
alpha(oas_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9785862

outrage_items <- select(study2_data,
                        which(study2_variables=="outrage1"):
                         which(study2_variables=="outrage2"))
alpha(outrage_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9466803

empathy_items <- select(study2_data,
                        which(study2_variables=="empathy1"):
                         which(study2_variables=="empathy3"))
alpha(empathy_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9398481

standing_items <- select(study2_data,
                         which(study2_variables=="standing1"):
                          which(study2_variables=="standing4"))
alpha(standing_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9657614

support_items <- select(study2_data,
                        which(study2_variables=="support1"):
                         which(study2_variables=="support3"))
alpha(support_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9236047

mi_items <- select(study2_data,
                   which(study2_variables=="mi1"):
```

```
                which(study2_variables=="mi5"))
alpha(mi_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9656434

abs_items <- select(study2_data,
                which(study2_variables=="abs1"):
                  which(study2_variables=="abs5"))
alpha(abs_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9876222

# select variables and run correlations
study2_data_agg <- select(study2_data,
                          ddw,
                          do,
                          oas,
                          outrage,
                          empathy,
                          standing,
                          support,
                          mi,
                          abs)

study2_corr <- apa_cor_table(study2_data_agg)
# study2_corr

#########################

study2_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do

#third stage
standing ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do

study2_h1 := ko
study2_h2 := uo
study2_h3 := ko-uo
study2_h4 := ko*oa
study2_h5 := ko*oast
study2_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study2_h7 := uo*oe
study2_h8 := uo*oasu
study2_h9 := uo*oe*esu
```

```
study2_ang_med := oa*ost
study2_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study2_model.fit <- sem(study2_model,
                        data = study2_data_agg,
                        fixed.x = TRUE,
                        se = "bootstrap",
                        bootstrap = 5000,
                        parallel = "snow",
                        ncpus = 12)

study2_summary <- summary(study2_model.fit,
                          fit.measures = TRUE,
                          standardize = FALSE,
                          rsquare = TRUE)

# study2_summary

study2_results <- parameterEstimates(study2_model.fit,
                                     boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                     level = 0.95,
                                     standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study2_results <- study2_results%>%
  filter(grepl('study2_', label))

study2_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
  study2_results$ci.lower*study2_results$ci.upper > 0,
  'Significant',
  '')

# study2_results

# limiting the sample to oas >1 did not change results

study2_oas_data_agg = study2_data_agg[study2_data_agg$oas >1, ]

study2_oas_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do

#third stage
standing ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do
```

```
study2_h1 := ko
study2_h2 := uo
study2_h3 := ko-uo
study2_h4 := ko*oa
study2_h5 := ko*oast
study2_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study2_h7 := uo*oe
study2_h8 := uo*oasu
study2_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study2_ang_med := oa*ost
study2_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study2_oas_model.fit <- sem(study2_oas_model,
                        data = study2_oas_data_agg,
                        fixed.x = TRUE,
                        se = "bootstrap",
                        bootstrap = 5000,
                        parallel = "snow",
                        ncpus = 12)

study2_oas_summary <- summary(study2_oas_model.fit,
                         fit.measures = TRUE,
                         standardize = FALSE,
                         rsquare = TRUE)

study2_oas_results <- parameterEstimates(study2_oas_model.fit,
                                 boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                 level = 0.95,
                                 standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study2_oas_results <- study2_oas_results%>%
  filter(grepl('study2_', label))

study2_oas_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
  study2_results$ci.lower*study2_results$ci.upper > 0,
  'Significant',
  '')

# study2_oas_results

#########################

# including moral identity as control

study2_withmi_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do + mo*mi

# second stage
```

```
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do + mi
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do + mi

#third stage
standing ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do + mi
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do + mi

study2_h1 := ko
study2_h2 := uo
study2_h3 := ko-uo
study2_h4 := ko*oa
study2_h5 := ko*oast
study2_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study2_h7 := uo*oe
study2_h8 := uo*oasu
study2_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study2_ang_med := oa*ost
study2_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study2_withmi_model.fit <- sem(study2_withmi_model,
                        data = study2_data_agg,
                        fixed.x = TRUE,
                        se = "bootstrap",
                        bootstrap = 5000,
                        parallel = "snow",
                        ncpus = 12)

study2_withmi_summary <- summary(study2_withmi_model.fit,
                          fit.measures = TRUE,
                          standardize = FALSE,
                          rsquare = TRUE)

study2_withmi_results <- parameterEstimates(study2_withmi_model.fit,
                                    boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                    level = 0.95,
                                    standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study2_withmi_results <- study2_withmi_results%>%
  filter(grepl('study2_', label))

study2_withmi_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
  study2_withmi_results$ci.lower*study2_withmi_results$ci.upper > 0,
  'Significant',
  '')

# study2_withmi_results

# including self abusive supervision as control
```

```
study2_withabs_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do + mo*abs

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do + abs
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do + abs

#third stage
standing ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do + abs
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do + abs

study2_h1 := ko
study2_h2 := uo
study2_h3 := ko-uo
study2_h4 := ko*oa
study2_h5 := ko*oast
study2_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study2_h7 := uo*oe
study2_h8 := uo*oasu
study2_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study2_ang_med := oa*ost
study2_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study2_withabs_model.fit <- sem(study2_withabs_model,
                          data = study2_data_agg,
                          fixed.x = TRUE,
                          se = "bootstrap",
                          bootstrap = 5000,
                          parallel = "snow",
                          ncpus = 12)

study2_withabs_summary <- summary(study2_withabs_model.fit,
                           fit.measures = TRUE,
                           standardize = FALSE,
                           rsquare = TRUE)

study2_withabs_results <- parameterEstimates(study2_withabs_model.fit,
                                  boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                  level = 0.95,
                                  standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study2_withabs_results <- study2_withabs_results%>%
 filter(grepl('study2_', label))

study2_withabs_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
 study2_withabs_results$ci.lower*study2_withabs_results$ci.upper > 0,
 'Significant',
 '')
```

```r
# study2_withabs_results

#########################
# Study 3 data analysis #
#########################

study3_variables = colnames(study3_data)

ddw_items <- select(study3_data,
                    which(study3_variables=="ddw1"):
                      which(study3_variables=="ddw6"))
alpha(ddw_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.7457404

do_items <- select(study3_data,
                   which(study3_variables=="udo1"):
                    which(study3_variables=="udo12"))
alpha(do_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9196707

oas_items <- select(study3_data,
                    which(study3_variables=="oas1"):
                      which(study3_variables=="oas5"))
alpha(oas_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9554911

outrage_items <- select(study3_data,
                        which(study3_variables=="outrage1"):
                          which(study3_variables=="outrage3"))
alpha(outrage_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9743129

empathy_items <- select(study3_data,
                        which(study3_variables=="empathy1"):
                          which(study3_variables=="empathy3"))
alpha(empathy_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9641095

sdev_items <- select(study3_data,
                     which(study3_variables=="sdev1"):
                       which(study3_variables=="sdev10"))
alpha(standing_items)$total[1]
```

```
##  raw_alpha
##  0.9657614

support_items <- select(study3_data,
                        which(study3_variables=="support1"):
                          which(study3_variables=="support3"))
alpha(support_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.8712443

mi_items <- select(study3_data,
                   which(study3_variables=="mi1"):
                     which(study3_variables=="mi5"))
alpha(mi_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9559944

t1_abs_items <- select(study3_data,
                       which(study3_variables=="t1_abs1"):
                         which(study3_variables=="t1_abs5"))
alpha(t1_abs_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9589724

t3_abs_items <- select(study3_data,
                       which(study3_variables=="t3_abs1"):
                         which(study3_variables=="t3_abs5"))
alpha(t3_abs_items)$total[1]

##  raw_alpha
##  0.9479337

# select variables and run correlations
study3_data_agg <- select(study3_data,
                          ddw,
                          do,
                          oas,
                          outrage,
                          empathy,
                          sdev,
                          support,
                          mi,
                          t1_abs,
                          t3_abs)

study3_corr <- apa_cor_table(study3_data_agg)
# study3_corr

#########################
```

```
study3_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do

#third stage
sdev ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do

study3_h1 := ko
study3_h2 := uo
study3_h3 := ko-uo
study3_h4 := ko*oa
study3_h5 := ko*oast
study3_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study3_h7 := uo*oe
study3_h8 := uo*oasu
study3_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study3_ang_med := oa*ost
study3_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study3_model.fit <- sem(study3_model,
                        data = study3_data_agg,
                        fixed.x = TRUE,
                        se = "bootstrap",
                        bootstrap = 5000,
                        parallel = "snow",
                        ncpus = 12)

study3_summary <- summary(study3_model.fit,
                          fit.measures = TRUE,
                          standardize = FALSE,
                          rsquare = TRUE)

# study3_summary

study3_results <- parameterEstimates(study3_model.fit,
                                     boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                     level = 0.95,
                                     standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study3_results <- study3_results%>%
  filter(grepl('study3_', label))

study3_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
  study3_results$ci.lower*study3_results$ci.upper > 0,
```

```
 'Significant',
 '')

# study3_results

#########################

# limiting the sample to oas >1 did not change results

study3_oas_data_agg = study3_data_agg[study3_data_agg$oas >1, ]

study3_oas_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do

#third stage
sdev ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do

study3_h1 := ko
study3_h2 := uo
study3_h3 := ko-uo
study3_h4 := ko*oa
study3_h5 := ko*oast
study3_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study3_h7 := uo*oe
study3_h8 := uo*oasu
study3_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study3_ang_med := oa*ost
study3_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study3_oas_model.fit <- sem(study3_oas_model,
                        data = study3_oas_data_agg,
                        fixed.x = TRUE,
                        se = "bootstrap",
                        bootstrap = 5000,
                        parallel = "snow",
                        ncpus = 12)

study3_oas_summary <- summary(study3_oas_model.fit,
                          fit.measures = TRUE,
                          standardize = FALSE,
                          rsquare = TRUE)

study3_oas_results <- parameterEstimates(study3_oas_model.fit,
```

```
                              boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                              level = 0.95,
                              standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study3_oas_results <- study3_oas_results%>%
  filter(grepl('study3_', label))

study3_oas_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
  study3_results$ci.lower*study3_results$ci.upper > 0,
  'Significant',
  '')

# study3_oas_results

#########################

# including moral identity as control

study3_withmi_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do + mo*mi

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do + mi
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do + mi

#third stage
sdev ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do + mi
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do + mi

study3_h1 := ko
study3_h2 := uo
study3_h3 := ko-uo
study3_h4 := ko*oa
study3_h5 := ko*oast
study3_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study3_h7 := uo*oe
study3_h8 := uo*oasu
study3_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study3_ang_med := oa*ost
study3_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study3_withmi_model.fit <- sem(study3_withmi_model,
                               data = study3_data_agg,
                               fixed.x = TRUE,
                               se = "bootstrap",
                               bootstrap = 5000,
                               parallel = "snow",
                               ncpus = 12)
```

```
study3_withmi_summary <- summary(study3_withmi_model.fit,
                         fit.measures = TRUE,
                         standardize = FALSE,
                         rsquare = TRUE)

study3_withmi_results <- parameterEstimates(study3_withmi_model.fit,
                                 boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                 level = 0.95,
                                 standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study3_withmi_results <- study3_withmi_results%>%
  filter(grepl('study3_', label))

study3_withmi_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
  study3_withmi_results$ci.lower*study3_withmi_results$ci.upper > 0,
  'Significant',
  '')

# study3_withmi_results

# including self abusive supervision at time 1 as control

study3_witht1_abs_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do + mo*t1_abs

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do + t1_abs
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do + t1_abs

#third stage
sdev ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do + t1_abs
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do + t1_abs

study3_h1 := ko
study3_h2 := uo
study3_h3 := ko-uo
study3_h4 := ko*oa
study3_h5 := ko*oast
study3_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study3_h7 := uo*oe
study3_h8 := uo*oasu
study3_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study3_ang_med := oa*ost
study3_emp_med := oe*esu
'

#Fit model
study3_witht1_abs_model.fit <- sem(study3_witht1_abs_model,
                          data = study3_data_agg,
```

```
                          fixed.x = TRUE,
                          se = "bootstrap",
                          bootstrap = 5000,
                          parallel = "snow",
                          ncpus = 12)

study3_witht1_abs_summary <- summary(study3_witht1_abs_model.fit,
                            fit.measures = TRUE,
                            standardize = FALSE,
                            rsquare = TRUE)

study3_witht1_abs_results <- parameterEstimates(study3_witht1_abs_model.fit,
                                    boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                    level = 0.95,
                                    standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study3_witht1_abs_results <- study3_witht1_abs_results%>%
 filter(grepl('study3_', label))

study3_witht1_abs_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
 study3_witht1_abs_results$ci.lower*study3_witht1_abs_results$ci.upper > 0,
 'Significant',
 '')

# study3_witht1_abs_results

# including self abusive supervision at time 3 as control

study3_witht3_abs_model <- '
# first stage
oas ~ ko*ddw + uo*do + mo*t3_abs

# second stage
outrage ~ oa*oas + ddw + do + t3_abs
empathy ~ oe*oas + ddw + do + t3_abs

#third stage
sdev ~ ost*outrage + oast*oas + ddw + do + t3_abs
support ~ esu*empathy + oasu*oas + ddw + do + t3_abs

study3_h1 := ko
study3_h2 := uo
study3_h3 := ko-uo
study3_h4 := ko*oa
study3_h5 := ko*oast
study3_h6 := ko*oa*ost
study3_h7 := uo*oe
study3_h8 := uo*oasu
study3_h9 := uo*oe*esu
study3_ang_med := oa*ost
study3_emp_med := oe*esu
```

```
'


#Fit model
study3_witht3_abs_model.fit <- sem(study3_witht3_abs_model,
                           data = study3_data_agg,
                           fixed.x = TRUE,
                           se = "bootstrap",
                           bootstrap = 5000,
                           parallel = "snow",
                           ncpus = 12)

study3_witht3_abs_summary <- summary(study3_witht3_abs_model.fit,
                             fit.measures = TRUE,
                             standardize = FALSE,
                             rsquare = TRUE)

study3_witht3_abs_results <- parameterEstimates(study3_witht3_abs_model.fit,
                                       boot.ci.type = "bca.simple",
                                       level = 0.95,
                                       standardized = T)[, c(4:6, 9, 10)]

study3_witht3_abs_results <- study3_witht3_abs_results%>%
 filter(grepl('study3_', label))

study3_witht3_abs_results$Significance_95 <- ifelse(
 study3_witht3_abs_results$ci.lower*study3_witht3_abs_results$ci.upper > 0,
 'Significant',
 '')

# study3_witht3_abs_results

# Summary of all model estimates

# study 2 results
# model 1 without control
study2_results

##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1       study2_h1 -0.199 0.081   -0.350   -0.035     Significant
## 2       study2_h2 -0.186 0.093   -0.359    0.001
## 3       study2_h3 -0.013 0.152   -0.309    0.279
## 4       study2_h4 -0.038 0.022   -0.094   -0.006     Significant
## 5       study2_h5 -0.078 0.035   -0.151   -0.016     Significant
## 6       study2_h6 -0.004 0.003   -0.013    0.000     Significant
## 7       study2_h7  0.002 0.012   -0.018    0.031
## 8       study2_h8 -0.027 0.020   -0.085   -0.002     Significant
## 9       study2_h9  0.000 0.001   -0.001    0.004
## 10 study2_ang_med  0.018 0.010    0.003    0.046     Significant
## 11 study2_emp_med -0.001 0.005   -0.015    0.008
```

```
# model 2 selecting sampel with observed abusive supervision greater than 1
study2_oas_results

##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study2_h1 -0.179 0.132   -0.433    0.089     Significant
## 2      study2_h2  0.023 0.161   -0.303    0.326
## 3      study2_h3 -0.202 0.258   -0.700    0.316
## 4      study2_h4 -0.040 0.037   -0.143    0.010     Significant
## 5      study2_h5 -0.052 0.042   -0.152    0.018     Significant
## 6      study2_h6 -0.003 0.005   -0.022    0.001     Significant
## 7      study2_h7  0.001 0.012   -0.021    0.032
## 8      study2_h8  0.003 0.027   -0.047    0.068     Significant
## 9      study2_h9  0.000 0.001   -0.001    0.002
## 10 study2_ang_med  0.018 0.017   -0.006    0.061     Significant
## 11 study2_emp_med  0.001 0.005   -0.006    0.018

# model 3 controlling moral identity
study2_withmi_results

##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study2_h1 -0.164 0.078   -0.317   -0.012     Significant
## 2      study2_h2 -0.074 0.103   -0.281    0.124
## 3      study2_h3 -0.090 0.156   -0.384    0.225
## 4      study2_h4 -0.030 0.020   -0.083   -0.004     Significant
## 5      study2_h5 -0.064 0.033   -0.135   -0.006     Significant
## 6      study2_h6 -0.003 0.002   -0.011    0.000     Significant
## 7      study2_h7  0.001 0.007   -0.007    0.026
## 8      study2_h8 -0.011 0.017   -0.057    0.014
## 9      study2_h9  0.000 0.001    0.000    0.003
## 10 study2_ang_med  0.017 0.010    0.003    0.043     Significant
## 11 study2_emp_med -0.001 0.005   -0.016    0.006

# model 4 controlling self abusive supervision
study2_withabs_results

##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study2_h1  0.037 0.052   -0.061    0.140
## 2      study2_h2 -0.100 0.048   -0.190   -0.006     Significant
## 3      study2_h3  0.136 0.087   -0.035    0.309
## 4      study2_h4  0.005 0.010   -0.006    0.043
## 5      study2_h5  0.008 0.013   -0.011    0.047
## 6      study2_h6  0.000 0.001    0.000    0.005
## 7      study2_h7 -0.003 0.010   -0.027    0.014
## 8      study2_h8  0.000 0.012   -0.026    0.024
## 9      study2_h9  0.000 0.001   -0.003    0.001
## 10 study2_ang_med  0.013 0.013   -0.005    0.048
## 11 study2_emp_med  0.002 0.008   -0.011    0.025

# study 3 results
# model 1 without control
study3_results
```

```
##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study3_h1 -0.065 0.043   -0.146    0.021
## 2      study3_h2 -0.100 0.044   -0.188   -0.018     Significant
## 3      study3_h3  0.035 0.069   -0.096    0.174
## 4      study3_h4 -0.015 0.012   -0.048    0.002
## 5      study3_h5 -0.004 0.005   -0.021    0.000
## 6      study3_h6  0.000 0.000    0.000    0.000
## 7      study3_h7 -0.030 0.016   -0.074   -0.006     Significant
## 8      study3_h8 -0.027 0.014   -0.063   -0.005     Significant
## 9      study3_h9  0.001 0.002   -0.001    0.006
## 10 study3_ang_med  0.000 0.001   -0.003    0.001
## 11 study3_emp_med -0.010 0.015   -0.048    0.015
```

```
# model 2 selecting sampel with observed abusive supervision greater than 1
study3_oas_results
```

```
##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study3_h1 -0.043 0.091   -0.208    0.153
## 2      study3_h2 -0.048 0.094   -0.234    0.136     Significant
## 3      study3_h3  0.005 0.142   -0.268    0.296
## 4      study3_h4 -0.005 0.016   -0.061    0.014
## 5      study3_h5 -0.003 0.010   -0.035    0.007
## 6      study3_h6  0.000 0.000    0.000    0.001
## 7      study3_h7 -0.004 0.015   -0.058    0.013     Significant
## 8      study3_h8 -0.008 0.019   -0.056    0.024     Significant
## 9      study3_h9  0.000 0.001   -0.001    0.008
## 10 study3_ang_med -0.001 0.002   -0.007    0.002
## 11 study3_emp_med -0.003 0.015   -0.059    0.014
```

```
# model 3 controlling moral identity
study3_withmi_results
```

```
##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study3_h1 -0.063 0.043   -0.143    0.025
## 2      study3_h2 -0.089 0.048   -0.188    0.001
## 3      study3_h3  0.026 0.073   -0.110    0.176
## 4      study3_h4 -0.014 0.012   -0.046    0.003
## 5      study3_h5 -0.004 0.005   -0.020    0.000
## 6      study3_h6  0.000 0.000    0.000    0.000
## 7      study3_h7 -0.027 0.018   -0.071   -0.001     Significant
## 8      study3_h8 -0.024 0.016   -0.063   -0.001     Significant
## 9      study3_h9  0.001 0.002   -0.001    0.006
## 10 study3_ang_med  0.000 0.001   -0.003    0.001
## 11 study3_emp_med -0.010 0.015   -0.046    0.016
```

```
# model 4 controlling time 1 self abusive supervision
study3_witht1_abs_results
```

```
##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1      study3_h1  0.001 0.033   -0.059    0.070
## 2      study3_h2 -0.056 0.033   -0.124    0.004
## 3      study3_h3  0.057 0.055   -0.045    0.174
```

```
## 4       study3_h4  0.000 0.008   -0.014    0.019
## 5       study3_h5  0.000 0.002   -0.003    0.004
## 6       study3_h6  0.000 0.000    0.000    0.000
## 7       study3_h7 -0.021 0.016   -0.065    0.000
## 8       study3_h8 -0.013 0.011   -0.044    0.001
## 9       study3_h9  0.001 0.001   -0.001    0.006
## 10 study3_ang_med  0.000 0.001   -0.003    0.001
## 11 study3_emp_med -0.012 0.019   -0.058    0.018
```

```
# model 4 controlling time 3 self abusive supervision
study3_witht1_abs_results
```

```
##            label    est    se ci.lower ci.upper Significance_95
## 1       study3_h1  0.001 0.033   -0.059    0.070
## 2       study3_h2 -0.056 0.033   -0.124    0.004
## 3       study3_h3  0.057 0.055   -0.045    0.174
## 4       study3_h4  0.000 0.008   -0.014    0.019
## 5       study3_h5  0.000 0.002   -0.003    0.004
## 6       study3_h6  0.000 0.000    0.000    0.000
## 7       study3_h7 -0.021 0.016   -0.065    0.000
## 8       study3_h8 -0.013 0.011   -0.044    0.001
## 9       study3_h9  0.001 0.001   -0.001    0.006
## 10 study3_ang_med  0.000 0.001   -0.003    0.001
## 11 study3_emp_med -0.012 0.019   -0.058    0.018
```